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COMPLEIE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT 
The parties missing from the caption of the case are the defendants: 1) Lundberg & 
Associates, a Professional Corporation; 2) Backman i itie Company. : Corporation; 
3) Backman-Stewail Title Service^ 1 kl ., a 11 l.ih I Minimi Partnership, 4) Canyon Anderson; 
4) Rodney Services Company, a Utah Corporation; and John Does 1 through 10. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the Russell's 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty because no fiduciary duty was owed to them or the other 
trustors/borro wers. 
2. Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Lundberg 
defendants did not owe the Russells the duty to deal with them honestly or the duty to 
foreclosure the trust deed in conformity with the Utah foreclosure statute. 
3. Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the non-judicial 
foreclosure statute, Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann., did not have the purpose of 
protecting the Russells and the other trustors/borrowers and that the Lundberg defendants 
did not violate this statute by charging costs that were inflated above the actual costs 
incurred by Scott Lundberg as the trustee. 
4. Whether the court erred as a matter of law by ruling that Scott Lundberg was 
not a party to the trust deeds in which he was the original trustee in the Russell's case and 
either the original trustee or the substituted trustee for the putative class members; was not 
bound by the terms of the trust deeds, including the limitation to the actual costs incurred 
in the foreclosures; and he could not be held liable for breach of these contracts and breach 
6 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
5. Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Lundberg 
defendants owed no duty to charge the foreclosure fees and only the actual costs incurred 
in the foreclosures as set forth in the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, the VA, the FHA and 
the private servicing agreements. 
6. Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the defendants did not 
unjustly enrich themselves, that no restitution of the costs in excess of the actual costs 
incurred by the defendants should be made, and that no restitution of the fees and costs 
charged in excess of the those allowed by the regulations and private servicing contracts 
should be made. 
7. Whether the court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Lundberg 
defendants did not engage in a constructive fraud against the Russells and the other 
homeowners in charging fees and costs in excess of the actual costs and fees allowed by the 
trust deeds, the regulations and private servicing agreements and the Utah foreclosure 
statute, Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann. 
8. Whether the court erred as a matter of law that the Lundberg defendants did 
not affirmatively defraud the Russells and the other trustors/borrowers by charging fees and 
costs in excess of the actual costs and fees allowed by the trust deeds, the regulations and 
private servicing agreements and the Utah foreclosure statute, Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah 
Code Ann. 
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9. Whether the court erred as a matter of law that the Lundberg defendants did 
not negligently misrepresent the amounts that could be legally charged for costs and fees of 
foreclosure to the Russells and the other trustors/borrowers by charging fees and costs in 
excess of the actual costs and fees allowed by the trust deeds, the regulations and private 
servicing agreements and the Utah foreclosure statute, Title 57, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann. 
10. Whether the court erred as a matter of law that the defendants were not 
engaged in a civil conspiracy. 
11. Whether the court erred as a matter of law that the defendants did not violate 
the Utah Unfair Practices Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 13-5-1, et.seq. 
12. Whether the court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the claim for punitive 
damages. 
Each of these issues were defended by the Russells at the trial court. See 
Memorandums in Opposition to Motions of Lundberg and Backman Stewart. R. 196,220, 
719, 784, 914, 956, 960 and 1004. Since each of these issues were decided on summary 
judgment or on a motion to dismiss, the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the 
Russells and no deference is given to the trial court's conclusions and the conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634,636-37 
(Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL, 
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Utah Code Ann.§§ 57-1-20 to 32. (Utah non-judicial power of sale foreclosure statute.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
II. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The plaintiffs are Utah home owners. Mr. Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates act 
as the foreclosing trustee in thousands of non-judicial foreclosures each year in Utah. They 
conducted three foreclosures on the plaintiffs' home. Backman Title Company and/or 
Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd. provide title work and a title insurance product known 
as a "trustee's sale guarantee" to the Lundberg defendants for each of the foreclosures. 
Canyon Anderson is the president of Backman Title Company who negotiated Backman's 
contract with the Lundberg defendants. Rodney Services Company is a corporation created 
by Scott Lundberg and owned by him and his children. 
The Lundberg defendants are limited by the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, the VA 
and the FHA to a certain amount, typically $550.00 to $650.00, for non-judicial foreclosure 
fees. Mr. Lundberg was limited to the same amount of fees by servicing agreements with 
mortgage servicing companies and lenders who hire him to act as the foreclosing trustee. 
In the case of the Russells, the foreclosure fees were limited by a servicing agreement to the 
same amount allowed by FNMA regulations. These same regulations and servicing 
agreements limited the amount that could be charged for foreclosure costs to the actual costs 
incurred in each foreclosure. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-21, et. seq., also limited the costs that could be charged by a 
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trustee to the actual costs incurred. The Russells trust deed, which was a standard FNMA 
trust deed, also limited the costs that could be charged to the actual costs incurred. 
The Lundberg defendants used various methods to enhance the amount that they 
charged in each of the thousands of foreclosures, including the three foreclosures on the 
Russell's home, to an amount above those allowed by the regulations, the servicing 
contracts, the trust deeds and the Utah foreclosure statute. These methods focused on 
charging inflated costs which were substantially above the actual costs incurred by the 
Lundberg defendants. These inflated costs included: 
a. The payment of costs for posting of notices of trustee's sales that were almost 
twice the amount charged Lundberg by the persons posting the notices; 
b. The payment of inflated costs to the Intermountain Commercial Record, and 
possibly other newspapers, for publishing the notices of trustee's sales and the kickback of 
portions of the inflated costs to the Lundberg defendants; and 
c. The payment of premiums for title work, including the trustee sale guarantees, 
with the kickback of up to 30% of these premiums to the Lundberg defendants. 
III. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN TRIAL COURT. 
The trial court dismissed all fifteen of the Russell's causes of action over a series of 
orders.1 The orders are: 
1
 All fifteen causes of action applied to the Lundberg defendants, including 
Rodney Services. The fifth, sixth, eighth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth causes of 
action were directed towards the Backman-Stewart defendants. 
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1. Memorandum Decision entered September 30,2002 and consequent order of 
dismissal and partial summary judgment of October 30, 2002 and October 16, 2002. The 
decision was based upon the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of the Lundberg 
defendants and the Motion to Dismiss of the Backman-Stewart defendants. The Lundberg 
Partial Summary Judgment dismissed the first (breach of fiduciary duty), second 
(constructive fraud), third (breach of contract) and fourth (breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing) causes of action with prejudice. The Backman-Stewart Order of 
Dismissal dismissed the fifth (restitution-mistake of fact), sixth (restitution-mistake of law) 
and thirteenth (civil conspiracy) causes of action without prejudice (subsequently dismissed 
with prejudice by the Order of November 4, 2003). 
2. Memorandum Decision entered August 14, 2003 and resulting summary 
judgment and judgment on the pleadings of September 8, 2003 on behalf of the Lundberg 
defendants and Rodney Services and summary judgment for Backman-Stewart defendants 
of October 1, 2003. The Lundberg summary judgment dismissed the first four causes of 
action with prejudice against Rodney Services. It also dismissed the fifth (restitution-
mistake of fact), sixth (restitution-mistake of law), seventh (tortuous payment of money), 
eighth (unjust enrichment), ninth (wrongful collection), tenth (liability for intended 
consequences), eleventh (affirmative fraud), twelfth (negligent misrepresentation), thirteenth 
(civil conspiracy), fourteenth (Utah Unfair Practices Act), and fifteenth (punitive damages) 
causes of action with prejudice against the Lundberg defendants, including Rodney 
11 
Services.2 The Backman-Stewart summary judgment dismissed the eighth, fourteenth and 
fifteenth causes of action with prejudice. 
3. Order of Dismissal with Prejudice of November 4,2003. This order dismissed 
the fifth, sixth, and thirteenth causes of action against the Backman-Stewart defendants with 
prejudice. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
A. Loan on the Russell's home and foreclosures. 
1. On August 8, 1997, Mr. and Mrs. Russell entered into a mortgage on their 
home. Among the documents that they executed were an Adjustable Rate Note, with a Rider 
B, and a Deed of Trust, copies of which are attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A" 
thereto. R.29. Para. 4, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002 
(incorporating allegations of Russell's Complaint). R.124. 
2. Lundberg was appointed the original trustee under the terms of the trust deed. 
Para. 5, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.124. The Loan 
was sold to another lender and Lundberg continued to serve as the trustee after the sale. Id. 
at para. 7. 
3. The Russells defaulted under the terms of the loan documents and foreclosure 
was commenced by the Lundberg defendants as trustee under the Deed of Trust. Para. 8 & 
9, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002 (incorporating 
2
 The order also denied the motion for class certification of the Russells. 
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allegations of Russell's Complaint). R.125. 
4. Mr. Lundberg, as the trustee under the trust deed, set the Russell's home for 
sale. Para. 10, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.125. 
5. Mr. and Mrs. Russell cured the default on or about April 23, 1998 by paying 
the missed payments on the mortgage, interest, and the fees and costs charged to the 
beneficiary by the Lundberg defendants. Para. 11, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary 
Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.126. This payment included the following monies, as the 
foreclosure fees and costs billed to the lender by the Lundberg defendants: 
A. Trustee sale guarantee $767.00 
B. Recording of Substitution of Trustee 10.00 
C. Recording of Notice of Default 12.00 
D. Certified mail 93.00 
E. Attorneys fees 425.00 
F. Publication of Notice of Sale 83.07 
G. Posting of Notice of Sale 40.00 
H. Recording of Cancellation of Notice of Default 12.00 
$1,442.07 
See response to para. 12 of the Complaint in Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services. 
R.51 and R.76. See also Lundberg letter of September 14, 2001. R.247. 
6. Mr. and Mrs. Russell again defaulted on their mortgage and another 
foreclosure was commenced by the Lundberg defendants as trustee under the Deed of Trust. 
Para. 12 & 13, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002 
(incorporating allegations of Russell's Complaint). R.126. 
7. Mr. Lundberg, as the trustee under the trust deed, set the Russells' home for 
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sale. Para. 14, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.126. 
8. Mr. and Mrs. Russell cured the second default on or about August 3,1999 by 
paying the missed payments on the mortgage, interest, and the fees and costs charged to the 
beneficiary by the Lundberg defendants. Para. 15, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary 
Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.126. This payment included the following monies, as the 
foreclosure fees and costs billed to the lender by the Lundberg defendants: 
A. Trustee sale guarantee $760.00 
B. Recording of Notice of Default 10.00 
D. Certified mail 62.00 
E. Attorneys fees 550.00 
F. Publication of Notice of Sale 115.00 
G. Posting of Notice of Sale 40.00 
H. Recording of Cancellation of Notice of Default 10.00 
$1,547.00 
See response to para. 14 of the Complaint in Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services. 
R.52andR.76. See also Lundberg letter of September 14, 2001. R.247. 
9. Mr. and Mrs. Russell defaulted a third time under the terms of the loan 
documents and another foreclosure was commenced by the Lundberg defendants as trustee 
under the Deed of Trust. Para. 16 & 17, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of 
Mar. 19, 2002 (incorporating allegations of Russell's Complaint). R.126 & 127. 
10. Mr. Lundberg, as the trustee under the trust deed, set the Russells' home for 
sale. Para. 18, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment of Mar. 19, 2002. R.127. 
11. Mr. and Mrs. Russell cured the default on or about November 3, 2000 by 
paying the missed payments on the mortgage, interest, and the fees and costs charged to the 
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lender by the Lundberg defendants. Para. 19, Lundberg Mem. in Spt. of Summary Judgment 
of Mar. 19, 2002. R. 127. This payment included the following monies, as the foreclosure 
fees and costs billed to the lender by the Lundberg defendants: 
A. Trustee sale guarantee $757.00 
B. Recording of Notice of Default 10.00 
D. Certified mail 43.00 
E. Attorneys fees 550.00 
F. Publication of Notice of Sale 143.40 
G. Posting of Notice of Sale 65.00 
H. Recording of Cancellation of Notice of Default 10.00 
$1,578.40 
See response to para. 16 of the Complaint in Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services. 
R.52 and R.77. See also Lundberg letter of September 14, 2001. R.247. 
B. The foreclosure business of the Lundberg defendants and the Backman-
Stewart defendants. 
12. The Lundberg defendants conduct several thousand trust deed foreclosures 
each year against Utah home owners such as the Russells. See Answers of Lundberg and 
Rodney Services to paragraphs 18 & 30 of Complaint. R.53, 56, 78 &80. 
13. Most of the home mortgages that are foreclosed by the Lundberg defendants 
fall under the rules and regulations of the Veterans Administration ("VA"), the Federal 
Housing Administration ("FHA"), or under non-mortgage insured loans, called conventional 
loans. See Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services to paragraph 30 of Complaint. R.56 
& R.80. 
14. The VA, FHA, and lenders and loan servicers of conventional loans have 
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guidelines and regulations that limit the amount that the Lundberg defendants can charge 
for trustee's fees and foreclosure costs. See Answers of Lundberg and Rodney Services to 
paragraph 30 of Complaint. R.56 & R.80.3 These regulations also limit the costs that can 
be charged to the actual costs incurred by the trustee. Id. 
15. Lundberg handled the three foreclosures on the Russells' home pursuant to an 
agreement with Aames Capital Corp. ("Aames"), the servicer of the Russells' mortgage, a 
copy of which is attached to the Russell's Addendum of Facts. R.963. Lundberg also 
foreclosed the Russell's home pursuant to a letter entitled "Aames Attorney Performance 
Expectations" also attached to the Addendum. R.963. 
16. According to the Aames contract, Lundberg could only charge the fees and 
costs in the Russells' foreclosures allowed by FNMA. Para. 2 of Agreement. R.963 
17. Attached to the Addendum is a copy of The National Mortgage Servicer's 
Reference Directory, produced in discovery by Lundberg, that sets forth the fees and costs 
allowed by FNMA, FHLMC, the VA and FHA. R.919. See also R.236-243. Only the 
reasonable out-of-pocket costs; i.e. the actual costs incurred, are allowed by FNMA. FNMA 
does not allow overhead expenses of the trustee, secretarial charges, notary fees, postage, 
photocopying charges, and certified copy charges. The trustee is not allowed to charge the 
3
 The fees were between $450.00 and $650.00. See fee charts. Dennis A. 
Jankowski, The National Mortgage Servicer's Reference Directory, Vernon Enterprises 
(17th Ed.), p. 1-22 & 1-23 FNMA fee chart, p. 2-14 & 2-15 FHLMC fee chart, p. 3-83 
VA fee chart, p. 4-11 - 4-13, HUD (FHA) fee chart. R. 236-243. 
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borrower, such as the Russells, more to reinstate the loan than the amount allowed by 
FNMA. Id. at 1-21. R.922.4 
18. Lundberg wrote a summary of Utah foreclosure law published in The National 
Mortgage Servicer's Reference Directory. It is attached to the Russell Addendum of Facts. 
R.923. In his summary, Mr. Lundberg sets out the "allowable fees" under Utah foreclosure 
law. He writes "[t]he lender may recover fees, costs and advances provided they are 
reasonable, actually incurred and permitted by the documents." [Emphasis added.] Id. 
R.927. 
19. Lundberg knew that he was proscribed from charging the Russells for the 
artificially inflated posting and publishing costs. See Reference Directory. R.927. 
Lundberg knew that he could charge only the actual costs of the TSG's to him. He could 
not keep the kickbacks or commissions paid to him for the TSG business from the title 
company. Id. The trust deed prohibited him from charging more for these costs than he 
actually incurred. FNMA prohibited him from doing so. The Utah foreclosure statute 
prohibited from doing so. He knew it and wrote in his summary for all other Utah 
foreclosure trustees to read that they had to limit their charges to the "actual costs" incurred 
and "the costs allowed by the trust deed." Id. 
C, Excess charges. 
1. Rodney Services Company. 
4
 FHLMC, VA, FHA have similar restrictions in foreclosures of their trust deeds. 
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20. Rodney Services was created by Scott Lundberg in May, 2000. Maren L. 
Dalton Aff. at para. 4&5. R.655.5 
21. Mr. Lundberg owned 89% of Rodney Services and his son, Derek, owned 
11%. After this lawsuit was filed, Mr. Lundberg changed the ownership of Rodney to his 
children with 12.5% each and his wife, Laurie, with 25%. Dalton Aff. at para. 5. R.655. 
22. Mr. Lundberg claims to have not received any compensation from Rodney. 
However, he admits to receiving the profits of Rodney. Lundberg Aff. of April 22, 2003, 
at para. 7. R.663. 
23. Rodney is located in the same building as Lundberg's foreclosure firm. 
Compare the addresses of Rodney and Lundberg on the invoice attached to the Opp. Mem. 
to March 12,2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "C" thereto. R.772. The building 
is owned by Mr. Lundberg. 
2. Excess charges for posting of foreclosure notices. 
24. Mr. Lundberg charged the Russells $40.00 for the posting of the notices in 
each of the first two foreclosures. Response to interrogatory number 15, attached to the 
Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "B" thereto. R.759. 
5
 Ms. Dalton claims to the president and managing officer of Rodney Services. 
She is one of the daughters of Mr. Lundberg. Prior to the existence of Rodney, she 
posted the Russells' house in the 1998 foreclosure and billed for her services in her 
maiden name, Maren Lundberg. See computer printouts (p.3, line 7) of foreclosure 
activity on the Russells' house produced by Lundberg in response to requests for 
production, April 6, 1998 entry, which printouts are attached to plaintiffs Opp. Mem. to 
March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "A" thereto. R.736. 
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25. Both of these foreclosures were completed before Rodney was formed. Dalton 
Aff. para. 13 & 16. R.657 & 658. 
26. Rodney charged the Russells $65.00 to post the notices in the third foreclosure. 
Response to interrogatory number 15, attached to the Opp. Mem. to March 12,2003 Motion 
of Rodney Services as Exhibit "B" thereto. R.759. See also Rodney invoice # 501 attached 
to the Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "C" thereto. 
R.772. 
27. Rodney paid Mr. Lundberg's wife, Laurie Lundberg, $35.00 to post the 
foreclosures. See Rodney statement, history of payment and Check #1150, attached to the 
Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "D" thereto. R.774 
& 775. Thus, Rodney was charging $30.00 more to post houses than it was paying the 
people who posted them. This overcharge was a practice used by Rodney in all foreclosures. 
Dalton Aff. para. 7. R.656. Prior to the formation of Rodney, Lundberg was charging $5.00 
to $10.00 more than he was paying the persons posting the homes on which he was 
foreclosing. See charges to the Russells for the first two foreclosures, above. 
28. Lundberg was paid up to $550.00 as his fee for each foreclosure on the 
Russell's home. See charges to the Russells in para. 5, 8 and 11, above. He was paid up to 
$650.00 as his fee for handling other foreclosures. See Reference Directory, R.236-243. 
The $550.00 charged on the Russell's foreclosures was the maximum amount allowed by 
the Aames servicing agreement. See para. 16 & 17, above. Managing the posting of 
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foreclosures was part of the services for which Mr. Lundberg was paid his trustee's fee. 
Prior to the creation of Rodney, Mr. Lundberg's employees performed the simple task of 
sending a copy of the foreclosure notice to the person posting the notice as part of their work 
for which Lundberg was paid the $550.00 - $650.00. After Rodney was formed, Lundberg's 
employees took the same step of sending the notice, but it was sent to Rodney. 
29. Rodney was set up as a "middle man." It was set up to enable Lundberg to 
charge for these services which should have been included in his trustee's fee. He formed 
Rodney to hid the fact that $30.00 of the $65.00 charged by Rodney was in excess of the 
actual costs of posting. This overcharge went into his pocket as profit, or rent paid to him 
as Rodney's landlord, or went into the pockets of his wife and children as the owners of 
Rodney. The $30.00 added up to a substantial amount given the fact that Mr. Lundberg 
conducted thousands of Utah foreclosures each year. 
3. Excess charges for publication costs. 
30. Mr. Lundberg charged the Russells $83.07 and $115,00 for publishing the 
notices in each of the first two foreclosures. Response to interrogatory number 15, attached 
to the Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "B" thereto. 
R.758. Both of these foreclosures were completed before Rodney was formed. Dalton Aff. 
para. 13 & 16. R.657 & 658. 
31. Rodney charged the Russells $143.00 to publish the notices in the third 
foreclosure. Response to interrogatory number 15, attached to the Opp. Mem. to March 12, 
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2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "B" thereto. R. 758. 
32. The amount of the publishing was increased by about $30.00 in the third 
foreclosure. This $30.00 was an administrative fee charged by Rodney. Dalton Aff. para. 
8. R.656. Rodney performed no service to earn the $30.00 other than the faxing of the 
notice to the newspaper. Prior to the formation of Rodney, Lundberg's employees sent a 
copy of the foreclosure notice to the newspaper for publication as part of the foreclosure 
work for which Lundberg was paid his fee of $550.00 to $650.00. Again, Rodney was 
acting as a middle man to artificially inflate the publication costs by $30.00, which $30.00 
went into the back pocket of Lundberg, or his family. Rodney performed no service other 
than the same minimal service for which Lundberg was already paid $550.00 to $650.00 to 
perform. This $30.00 per foreclosure added up to a substantial amount with the thousands 
of foreclosures handled by Lundberg each year. 
33. Rodney operated for a period charging this administrative fee for publishing. 
Dalton Aff. para. 9. R.656. Rodney, thereafter, negotiated a $30.00 kickback from the 
Intermountain Commercial Record whereby the Record would publish Lundberg's notices 
at the higher rate of $143.00 and then pay a "commission" back to Rodney of $30.00. Id. 
Attached to the Opp. Mem. to March 12, 2003 Motion of Rodney Services as Exhibit "D" 
thereto, R.773, is a list of 45 $30.00 kickbacks, totaling $1,350.00, paid to Rodney by the 
Intermountain Commercial Record for a seven day period in October 2000. (The $30.00 
kickback marked "521" was for the publication of one of the Russells' notices. This number 
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comports with the same number identifying the other charges made by Rodney to the 
Russells and is the reason that Rodney circled the number "521" on the exhibit.) 
4. Trustee Sale Guarantee fees, 
34. The Backman-Stewart defendants are in the title insurance business and 
provide title services to the Lundberg defendants in connection with their foreclosures. See 
response to para. 19 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.53. 
35. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19, et. seq. provides that the trustee conducting the 
foreclosure give notice to individuals that have recorded requests for notice. Prior to the 
middle 90fs, it was the custom of trustees to order foreclosure reports from title companies 
such as the Backman-Stewart defendants that identified the persons to whom notice had to 
be given under the Utah Code. These foreclosure reports typically cost between $200.00 to 
$300.00. See response to para. 20 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54. 
36. Occasionally, a title company would fail to identify someone to whom notice 
was required. If the person who was missed challenged the foreclosure, title to the property 
would be tainted and the person who purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, would 
be damaged. See response to para. 21 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54. 
37. In the middle 90's, the large quasi-government entities that would package, 
secure and sell large pools of mortgages to investors, FNMA and FHLMC, required the title 
insurance industry to come up with a product that would insure against the failure to 
properly identify the persons to whom notice should be sent. See response to para. 22 of 
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Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54. 
38. In response, the title insurance industry produced an insurance product, 
universally called "the Trustee's Sale Guarantee" ("TSG"). Like the foreclosure reports, the 
TSG identified all of the persons to whom notice of the trustee's foreclosure had to be sent 
under state law, and under Federal law when Federal tax liens were recorded against the 
property. However, the TSG had an insurance element, in that the title insurer, for whom 
the title company was an agent, insured that the people identified in the TSG were the 
correct persons that needed to receive notice. If the title company missed someone who 
should have received notice, the title insurer would pay the loss. See response to para. 23 
of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54. 
39. The title company and the title insurer charged a premium for this insurance. 
The premium was calculated as a percent of the principal of the loan that was being 
foreclosed. The premium was typically $250.00 to $300.00 more than the cost of 
foreclosure reports. In the case of the Russells, they were charged between $757.00 and 
$767.00 for the TSGs. See response to para. 24 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54. 
40. The amount of the TSG premium is determined by the title insurer. The agent 
for the insurer who issues the TSG charges according to the rates determined by the insurer. 
Because of the competitive nature of the title industry, the premiums charged for TSGs by 
competing insurers are within a couple of dollars of each other. Once the premium is 
determined by the insurer, the premium is filed with the Utah State Insurance Department. 
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All that the insurer needs to do to raise or lower the premium is file a new premium with the 
Department. The Utah Insurance Commission does not determine the amount that the title 
company can charge. See response to para. 24 of Complaint in Lundberg Answer. R.54. 
41. Prior to late 2000 or early 2001, Lundberg obtained a 3 0% limited partnership 
interest in Backman-Stewart. See para. 16 of Lundberg's facts in Mem. in Spt. of his April 
22, 2003 Motion. R.600. 
42. Lundberg was paid 30% of the premiums for the TSG's referred to Backman-
Stewart. Lundberg's check to Backman-Stewart would be sent as payment for a number of 
the TSG's and a return check was immediately cut from Backman-Stewart to Lundberg for 
30% of the these specific trustee sale guarantees. (The discovery necessary to set this fact 
was disputed and summaryjudgment was granted over the Russell's Rule 56(f) motion and 
objection.) 
43. Lundberg admits that he received commissions (money, kickbacks) from 
Backman-Stewart in recognition of the large volume of TSG business that he referred to 
Backman-Stewart. See para. 18 & 19 of Lundberg's facts in Mem. in Spt. of his April 22, 
2003 Motion. R.600 & 601. 
44. In August, 2000, Lundberg and Canyon Anderson, the President of Backman-
Stewart became worried about the direct splitting of premiums with Lundberg because of 
an investigation that was being conducted by the Utah Insurance Commission. See 
Lundberg letter to Canyon Anderson, dated August 8, 2000, concerning "Commission 
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income" attached to Lundberg's responses to requests for production. R. 770(a)-771. See 
also Lundberg "Commission Contract" with Backman-Stewart. R. 768-69. Lundberg and 
Backman-Stewart came up with a plan by which Backman-Stewart would continue to pay 
commissions to Lundberg because of his referral of TSG business, but Lundberg would also 
take an ownership interest in Backman-Stewart.6 
45. In this letter and contract, Lundberg recognized that it was illegal to split the 
TSG premiums with him unless he "contributes to the search and examination of the title or 
other services connected with it." Id. He attempted to meet this test by stating in the letter 
that he would sign the trustee sale guarantees and perform "title clearing work." Id. 
46. Mr. Lundberg, however, does not sign the TSG's. For example, the TSG's on 
each of the Russell's foreclosures were all prepared, reviewed and issued by employees of 
Backman-Stewart and then delivered to Lundberg. Lundberg performed no work on the 
TSG's. Nor did he contribute to the search and examination of the title. See TSG's attached 
6
 The Russells do not know the amount of "commissions" that were paid to 
Lundberg by Backman-Stewart. He refused to reveal this amount in discovery and 
summary judgment was granted over the Russell's Rule 56(f) motion and objection. The 
"commissions" were substantial. Mr. Lundberg identified in discovery that one month 
after this suit was filed, he stopped the payment of commissions to him for the TSG's, 
although he continued to place all of his TSG work with Backman-Stewart. To keep his 
income stream coming from Backman-Stewart, he started collecting $15,000 per month 
as "attorney's fees" for "title curative" work, although such work was actually 
performed for the lenders, not the title company. (See para. 47, below and R. 748.) Mr. 
Lundberg also refused to provide a history of attorney work performed or his billing 
records. He also started taking a salary of $4,000.00 per month at this time as an officer 
of Backman-Stewart. See answer to Interrogatory No. 4. R.748. 
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to Russell's Addendum of Facts, R.928-955. Not one of them were signed by Lundberg. 
They were all signed by representatives of the title company.7 
47. Mr. Lundberg 's title clearing work was performed for the lenders who paid 
him directly to do the work. He never performed title clearing work for Backman-Stewart. 
Title clearing work is required by lenders who send loans to Lundberg for foreclosure, not 
the title company. It has no benefit for the title company. This work consists of Lundberg's 
employees calling on other loans that are still of record even though they were paid off by 
the lender's loan. The Aames letter agreement concerning "Aames Attorney Performance 
Expectations" with Lundberg states that Lundberg is working for Aames, the lender, for title 
clearing. R.963. The letter identifies the "partnership" between Lundberg and Aames and 
the need "to protect Aames interest" and to "advise Aames of any issue that could cause a 
delay or jeopardize Aames' lien position." Id. The letter states that Aames has a "swat 
team" set up to work with its attorneys who handle foreclosures, such as Lundberg, to clear 
up any title problems that could "jeopardize Aames' lien position." Id. This is "title 
clearing." It is performed for the lender, not the title company. 
5. Payment of excess charges by the Russells and the other Utah 
borrowers. 
48. Lundberg charged the lender the amount of the posting and publication costs 
7
 Even if Mr. Lundberg would have signed the TSG's, it would not overcome the 
requirement of the Utah Insurance Code on splitting title commissions, that such a split 
can be made only with a person who actually performs the title search. Utah Code Ann.§ 
31A-23-404. Lundberg, admittedly, never searched any titles. 
26 
for each of the Russell's foreclosures. Lundberg Aff. of March 18,2002, para. 21. R.148. 
Lundberg also charged the lender the amount of the costs for the title work and the trustee 
sales' guarantees. Id. These charges were the actual amounts paid by Lundberg to 
Backman-Stewart, Rodney and the Commercial Record. They were not reduced by the 
amount of the kickbacks and commissions paid by the title company and the Intermountain 
Commercial Record to Lundberg and Rodney. The charges for posting was, likewise, not 
reduced by the $30.00 paid to Rodney in excess of the amount paid to the person actually 
posting the notices. See Lundberg's letter to the Russells' counsel of September 14, 2001, 
which identifies the amount charged to the Russells to bring their loan current and stop each 
of the three foreclosures. R. 776. The amount set forth in the letter as the costs of posting 
and publication is the full amount of these costs without reduction for the kickbacks, 
commissions or overcharges. 
49. Lundberg also sent a letter to the Russells in each foreclosure outlining the 
amount that needed to be paid in order to stop the foreclosures, which letter included all of 
his costs, including the inflated costs. Lundberg Aff., para. 24,31, and 39. R. 666,668 and 
670. See also Lundberg's letter to Russells' counsel of September 14, 2001, breaking out 
the costs. R. 776. 
50. The Russells were required to pay these inflated costs and were also required 
to pay the full amount of the trustee's fee allowed by the agency regulations and the Aames 
servicing contract before the foreclosures would be terminated and the trust deeds 
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"reinstated." R. 776. The other Utah borrowers had to pay these inflated costs to stop Mr. 
Lundberg's foreclosures. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As the trustee under the terms of the trust deed, Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells a 
number of duties. These duties included the duty to act honestly towards them in the 
foreclosures, the duty to foreclose in conformity with the Utah foreclosure statute and charge 
only the actual costs of foreclosure under the statute. The duties included a fiduciary duty 
because of the existence of a fiduciary relationship with the Russells at the time of the 
foreclosure. Mr. Lundberg, as the trustee under the trust deed, also owed the Russells the 
duties within the contract. Finally, he owed the Russells the duty to not charge more in costs 
than the actual costs allowed by the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, VA, FHA and the 
servicing agreements he had with the servicers and lenders. 
Fact issues certainly existed that established these duties. The trial court took the 
right to determine these fact issues from the jury. 
To the extent that the Court determines that a contractual duty did not exist, the 
alternative claim for unjust enrichment should be maintained. 
By engaging in the kickbacks, Lundberg, Backman-Stewart, the Commercial Record, 
Rodney and their principals established a monopoly for the foreclosure services work. This 
monopoly had at its heart the kickbacks that locked out other title companies and 
newspapers. This violated the Utah Unfair Practices Act. 
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Mr. Lundberg clearly knew that he could only charge the costs that he actually 
incurred in the foreclosures. He is the expert on foreclosures in Utah. He wrote the section 
on Utah foreclosure law in the desk book used by other trustees. In his writing, he instructed 
other trustees to limit their costs to those actually incurred. Nevertheless, he formed a 
dummy corporation to artificially inflate the foreclosure costs through nonexistent 
"administrative costs." He took kickbacks from providers of title work and newspapers for 
their services. The net result was that the costs that borrowers had to pay to stop the 
foreclosures on their homes were much more than the actual costs incurred by Mr. 
Lundberg. The jury should be able to consider punitive damages against Mr. Lundberg and 
the other defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred when it determined that Mr. Lundberg owed no duty to 
the Russells as the foreclosing trustee. 
Mr. Lundberg argued to the trial court that he, as a trustee, owed no duty to the 
trustors, the Russells, by statute, contract, or at common law absent some significant 
personal relationship that arose with the Russells at the time the trust deed was signed. The 
trial court agreed with this argument and dismissed the various claims of the Russells. 
The Russells contend that Mr. Lundberg owed them the high duty of a fiduciary 
under Utah common law. The Russells further contend that Mr. Lundberg at least owed 
them the duty to foreclosure their home consistent with the Utah foreclosure statute and 
consistent with the contractual requirements of the trust deed. Mr. Lundberg certainly owed 
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the Russells the duty to not defraud them. 
A* Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the high duty of a fiduciary. 
The duty owed by a foreclosing trustee to the trustors of a trust deed has been 
considered in a number of cases before Utah's appellate courts. In Blodgett v. Martschu 590 
P.2d 298, 301-03 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court determined that in the typical trust 
deed transaction there were two opportunities for a fiduciary duty to arise. The first 
opportunity was when the trust deed was signed. The second was at the time the trust deed 
was foreclosed. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that "the duty of the trustee under the trust deed was 
greater than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default 
provision of the trust deed instrument, it is a duty to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance 
with a high punctilio of honor." Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d at 302. The Court reasoned 
that the trustee owed the trustor this fiduciary duty because of the lack of court oversight in 
the non-judicial foreclosure process and the consequent prospect and ease of unfair dealing 
and overreaching by the trustee. Id. 
The unfair dealing and overreaching of a foreclosing trustee for the benefit of his own 
pocket is what this case is all about. Mr. Lundberg was not happy with the $450 to $650 in 
trustee's fees to which he was limited by his contract with the lender/servicer, Aames.8 He 
8
 The Aames contract adopted the FNMA limitation of $550 for fees and the 
requirement of only charging for actual costs incurred by the trustee. The other agencies 
for whom Mr. Lundberg foreclosed, FHLMC, the VA, and the FHA have similar 
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wanted more. He formed a dummy corporation, owned by himself and his family, to charge 
more for publication of the foreclosure notices and posting of the notices than was actually 
charged by the people posting and publishing the notices. The dummy corporation tried to 
hide the excess charges as "administrative fees." However, the only service provided by the 
dummy corporation to earn the administrative fee was to fax a copy of the foreclosure notice 
to the newspaper who published the notice and to the person who posted the notice. This 
simple act of faxing the notice was part of the foreclosure process for which Mr. Lundberg 
was paid $450.00 to $650.00 in fees. 
Mr. Lundberg also took a $30 kickback from the Intermountain Commercial Record 
on each notice sent to the Record for publication. He called them "commissions." Mr. 
Lundberg also took "commissions" from Backman-Stewart for the "large level of business 
sent to this title company. The business that he provided was the TSG's that Lundberg was 
required to obtain by the lenders, which TSG's cost the Russells about $757.00 in each 
foreclosure. 
The inflated foreclosure costs that Mr. Lundberg collected were substantial. He 
admits to performing thousands of foreclosures each year on the homes of Utah residents. 
He used the same practices in all of the foreclosures. The $60 in excess costs for publishing 




Mr. Lundberg never revealed how much in "commissions" that he received from 
Backman-Stewart for the TSG's. But, we know that one month after this suit was filed, he 
and Mr. Canyon Anderson of Backman-Stewart changed his compensation from 
commissions to $15,000 per month in attorney's fees (that he never kept track of by 
assignment or services performed) and $4,000 per month as an officer and director of 
Backman-Stewart. See para. 44, above. 
The Utah Supreme Court refined its position taken in Blodgett on a trustee's fiduciary 
duty in First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989). The 
Court held that in cases: 1) were the trustor reposes trust or confidence in the trustee and 
relies on the trustee's guidance; 2) where the trustee could exercise extraordinary influence 
over the trustor; or 3) where the trustee stands in a dominant position to the trustor, the 
trustee would have a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the trustor. Id. at 1256. l0 
The Russells were faced with the same dilemma with which every borrower is faced 
who must stop foreclosure of their home. They had to pay the amount of foreclosure costs 
demanded by the trustee. They had no control over the amount of these costs. They had no 
knowledge of the actual amount of the costs. They had no knowledge that Lundberg had 
9
 The summary of "commissions" paid to Mr. Lundberg for a short seven day 
period from the Commercial Record alone totaled $1,350. See fact para. 33. 
10
 This Court followed the Utah Supreme Court's analysis of the foreclosing 
trustee's fiduciary duty in Five F v. Heritage Savings Bank. 81 P.3d 105, 108 (Ut. App. 
2003). 
32 
artificially inflated the costs. They simply had to pay the costs in order to terminate the 
foreclosure and save their home. 
Mr. Lundberg sent the initial notice of default for each foreclosure from his office. 
It had his address on it and identified him as the foreclosing trustee. He sent the notice of 
sale from his office. It listed him as the foreclosing trustee. When it came time to cure the 
default, the Russells called his office to determine what they had to pay. They were given 
the figure by Mr. Lundberg's assistant. The Russells relied on this figure as the amount 
honestly owed under Utah law to cure the default and stop the foreclosures. 
Mr. Lundberg clearly stood in a dominant position to the Russells. He exercised 
extraordinary influence over them as he held the future ownership of their home in his 
hands. The Russells relied on his guidance as to the amount of costs that they had to legally 
pay in order to stop the foreclosures. The Banberry Crossing test of fiduciary duty was met. 
Mr. Lundberg argued that he could not be held to a fiduciary duty unless he had a 
personal relationship with the Russells at the time the trust deeds were signed. The trial 
court agreed. However, this is not the test of fiduciary duty set out in Banberry, which test 
can be met from the facts that arise during foreclosure. It is also a dangerous position for 
the courts of the state of Utah to take from a public policy point of view. In today's society, 
trustees are chosen by the lenders. Trustors have no input about the person who is to act as 
the trustee. The trustor needs the protection of a fiduciary to protect him or her from 
dishonest activities, such as the pocketing of excess moneys for costs not actually incurred 
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by the trustee. 
The Utah Legislature contemplated that the trustee would be a person who would act 
honestly towards the trustor. Utah Code Ann. §57-1-21 permits only persons or entities with 
credentials of trustworthiness, such as attorneys, to act as trustees. The Utah Supreme Court 
believed that the reason for this requirement was the high level of trust reposed in the trustee 
by the trustor and the beneficiary. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d at 302. 
B. Mr, Lundberg owed the Russells the lesser duty of foreclosing their home 
in a manner consistent with the Utah foreclosure statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Banberry Crossing that "the trustee's duty to the 
beneficiary does not imply that the trustee may ignore the trustor's rights and interests." First 
Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing. 780 P.2d at 1256. This Court held in FiveF 
that this meant that the trustee owed the trustor the duty to be honest and to at least follow 
the Utah foreclosure statute during the foreclosure even if the trustor could not establish the 
higher duty of a fiduciary. Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d at 108.1? 
Mr. Lundberg was not honest with the Russells. Further, he did not follow the Utah 
foreclosure statute when he charged inflated costs that were well above his actual costs 
incurred in the foreclosures. 
nThe duty of honesty and fairness is supported in other areas of commercial and 
real property law. In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a real estate agent hired by the seller may not owe a fiduciary 
duty to the buyer, but he owed the buyer a duty of "honesty, integrity, truthfulness, 
reputation, and competency." 
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The Utah Code contains numerous protections for trustors/borrowers.12 The 
protections are designed to protect the trustor's right to due process before the taking of his 
or her real property. The protections are also designed to protect the trustor from excess 
foreclosure fees and costs. To meet these objectives, the protections include a detailed 
method of giving notice to the trustor, to any other party who recorded a request for notice 
with the County Recorder, and to the general public. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-24, 25 & 26. 
The notice provisions are designed to develop interest in the upcoming sale in order to 
obtain the highest price possible and decrease the risk of a deficiency against the trustor. 
The trustor's protections also include the right to a public auction, the right of the 
trustor to direct the order by which the trust property should be sold if it consists of several 
lots, the duty of the trustee to obtain irrevocable offers, and the right to payment of any 
monies in excess of the amount due the lender and junior lienholders. Utah Code Ann. § 57-
1-27, 28 & 29. 
l2The Utah courts have recognized that the trust deed foreclosure sections of the 
Utah Code were designed to protect the trustor/borrower. Concepts, Inc. v. First Security 
Realty Services. Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1987), "[t]he statutes governing 
foreclosure sales under trust deeds protected the interests of plaintiffs [trustors] up to the 
moment that the property was sold and a trustee's deed issued."; Jones v. Johnson. 761 
P.2d 37, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), "[t]he detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's 
sale of real property under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 to 34 (1986) are intended to 
protect the debtor/trustor"; Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978), the duty 
of the trustee is to act on behalf of the trustors with diligence and good faith consistent 
with his primary obligation to assure the payment of the secured debt; and First Security 
Bank v. Felger. 658 F.Supp. 175, 183 (D.Utah 1987), the purpose of the trust deed 
foreclosure statute is to protect the borrower. 
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Of paramount importance to the trustor/borrower is the protection afforded in Utah 
Code Ann. §57-1 -29 that the trustee shall pay from the sale's proceeds his fees and costs that 
are actually incurred in the foreclosure, but not to exceed the fees and costs allowed by the 
trust deed. Mr. Lundberg's fees are set by the VA, FHA, FNMA, FHLMC and servicing 
agreements at between $450.00 and $650.00. In the Russell's case Mr. Lundberg's fees 
were set as the highest amount allowed by FNMA pursuant to the Aames contract. He 
illegally increased the money that he was paid by charging costs that were artificially inflated 
above the actual costs incurred by him. 
Another critical protection granted to the trustor/borrower is the right to cure the 
default of the trust deed, stop the foreclosure and save his or her home by paying the amount 
of the default, plus "costs and expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the 
obligation or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred . . ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1).13 The Russells cured each of their three foreclosures. Mr. 
13
 Mr. Lundberg argued to the trial court that Section 57-1-31, requiring the trustor 
to pay only the amount of fees, costs and expenses that are actually incurred is evidence 
that he has no statutory duty to be honest and fair with the trustor because the statute says 
that the trustor shall pay the beneficiary the amount of the obligation plus all such fees, 
costs and expenses actually incurred. Opp. Mem. at 14. Mr. Lundberg ignores the fact 
that he bills the lender for his inflated costs. The lender then tells the borrower, such as 
the Russells, to pay these costs in order to stop the foreclosure. In the Russell's case, Mr. 
Lundberg also sent a letter to them in each foreclosure outlining the amount that needed 
to be paid in order to terminate the foreclosure. The fact that the trustor pays Lundberg's 
fees and inflated costs to the beneficiary rather than to Mr. Lundberg is a distinction 
without meaning. What is important is the fact that Lundberg creates the pumped-up fees 
and they are paid by the lender if the borrower does not save the home from foreclosure 
or they are paid by the borrower if the home is saved, as in the Russells' case. 
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Lundberg, however, did not charge them the costs actually incurred in the foreclosures. He 
charged them the pumped up costs that had hidden commissions (kickbacks) and 
administrative costs for his dummy corporation, which administrative costs were incurred 
for the very same work for which he was paid the $550.00 in fees for handling each 
foreclosure. 
Finally, the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be obtained against a trustor 
is limited to "the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and 
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of 
the property as of the date of the sale." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. [Emphasis added.] This 
provision presumes that the costs, expenses and fees of the trustee are not illegally inflated. 
If they are illegally inflated then the purpose of this section, to limit the amount of a 
deficiency, is defeated. 
C. Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to not defraud them. 
In Banberry Crossing, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[ojbviously, a trust deed 
trustee may not scheme to defraud a trustor." First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry 
Crossing, 780 P.2d at 1256. Fraud can be committed by an affirmative misrepresentation 
or by an omission of a material fact where there is a duty to speak. Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369,1373 (Utah 1980). Lundberg committed both types of fraud. He 
sent a letter to the Russells in each foreclosure with the amount necessary to cure the default. 
This amount included his illegally inflated costs. He also told the lender the amount 
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necessary to cure the default, which included his excessive costs. The lender then, relying 
on Lundberg's statements, told the Russells to pay the pumped-up costs in order to stop the 
foreclosures. 
Lundberg also owed the Russells the duty to deal fairly with them. First Security 
Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing. 780 P.2d at 1256. He owed them the duty to charge 
only his actual costs under the Utah foreclosure statute, the trust deed, and the regulations 
of FNMA as adopted by the Aames servicing contract. He hid the fact that he had 
artificially jacked up his costs through kick-backs and administrative fees to a dummy 
corporation; that the costs were not his actual out of pocket costs. This constituted fraud by 
non-disclosure.14 
D. Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to not negligently misrepresent 
the amount of his actual costs. 
The trial court dismissed the Russells' claim for negligent misrepresentation based 
14
 To establish fraud, the Russells must prove by clear and convincing evidence: 1) 
a representation (or non-disclosure with a duty to disclose); 2) concerning a material fact; 
3) which was false; 4) which Lundberg knew to be false or was made recklessly knowing 
that the Russells had insufficient knowledge about the representation; 5) for the purpose 
of inducing the Russells to act thereon; 6) that was reasonably relied on by the Russells; 
7) in ignorance of its truth; 8) to their injury. Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 
P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982). Mr. Lundberg represented the costs to be something other 
than his actual costs or he failed to reveal that the costs were not his actual costs as 
required by the trust deed, Utah law, and the Aames contract. He knew of the 
misrepresentation, or should have realized that the Russells would have no idea about his 
actual costs. He made the representation, or omission, for the purpose of inducing the 
Russells to pay the inflated costs. The Russells relied on the representation, or omission, 
by paying the inflated costs and their reliance was reasonable. 
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upon the same reason that it dismissed the fraud claim; that no duty was owed by Mr. 
Lundberg to the Russells to accurately represent the amount of his actual costs. As argued 
above, Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to accurately represent his actual costs and 
collect no more costs than those he actually incurred. Christenson v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Co., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 1983). He breached this duty, either intentionally (fraud) or 
negligently (negligent misrepresentation). 
E. Mr, Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to abide by the terms of the 
trust deed in foreclosing their home. 
The Russell trust deed was a uniform FNMA/FHLMC trust deed.15 Mr. Lundberg 
is a party to the trust deed. He was the original trustee. He gave permission to the lender to 
use him as the trustee. Lundberg affidavit. R. 173 & 74. He was bound by its terms.16 
Mr. Lundberg argued that he was not a party to this contract. The trial court agreed 
with him. This position is contrary to his own act of agreeing to act as the trustee, agreeing 
to be named as such in the trust deed, and agreeing to abide by the foreclosure requirements 
l5The vast majority of trust deeds used in standard consumer first mortgages are 
such uniform trust deeds because the loans are pooled and packaged by large securities 
firms, such as Merrill Lynch, and sold as mortgaged backed securities in the securities 
markets. To assure the investors who purchase the securities that their rights are 
consistent among the numerous trust deeds that make up the pools, both FNMA and 
FHLMC require that standard trust deeds be used. 
16In the cases where he is not the original trustee, Mr. Lundberg agrees to be a 
substituted trustee and a Substitution of Trustee is recorded pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-22. He is then bound to the obligations of the trustee under the trust deed. 
Indeed, paragraph 23 of the trust deed states that the substituted trustee shall "succeed to 
all [the prior trustee's] title, estate, rights, powers and duties." R.39. 
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in the body of the trust deed.17 This Court considered whether a trustee was a party to a 
contract by acting as the trustee of a trust deed in Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank. 81 P.3d 
at 109. This Court held that so long as the trustee abided by his contractual duties and the 
requirements of the Utah foreclosure statute, he could not be held liable for breaching his 
contractual duties. Further, this Court ruled that a claim against the trustee for unjust 
enrichment was improper because the trustor had an action for breach of contract and breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the trustee failed to follow the Utah 
foreclosure statute. 
Both the lender for the Russells and Mr. Lundberg claimed the benefit of the default 
provisions of the contract when they foreclosed on the Russells. Yet, they denied the 
Russells the protections of the trust deed. These protections included the duty to pay the 
actual foreclosure costs if they reinstate the trust deed by curing the default, para. 18; the 
duty, at the trustee's sale, to pay the actual costs of the trustee, para. 21; and the duty of the 
trustor to reimburse the trustee for his fees "permitted by applicable law" and his actual 
costs, para. 35. The trust deed does not authorize the trustee to inflate his costs above the 
actual costs incurred by him. Mr. Lundberg, thereby, breached the terms of the trust deed. 
F. Mr. Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to abide by the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
17
 The trustee is granted certain rights and incurs certain duties under various 
provisions of paragraphs 21 to 35 of the trust deed. R. 39 & 40. The trust deed clearly 
treats him as a party to the contract. 
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Mr. Lundberg argued and the trial court agreed that he was not a party to a contract 
by his position as the trustee under the trust deed. They concluded that the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing did not, therefore, apply to him. 
Every contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Brehanv v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). This Court held that a trust deed, as 
a contract, was subject to such a covenant. Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d at 
109. This Court also held that, so long as the trustee forecloses in conformity with the 
contractual requirements of the trust deed and the Utah foreclosure statute, there can be no 
breach of the implied covenant. However, Mr. Lundberg did not foreclose in conformity 
with the requirements of the Russells' trust deed or the Utah foreclosure statute. He violated 
the protections of both in order to collect more money, as illegally inflated costs, than 
allowed by the statute or by the contract. He, thereby, violated the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
G. Mr. Lundberg owed a duty to not collect more than the $450 to $550 in 
fees and his actual costs for each foreclosure under the Aames servicing 
contract and the regulations of FNMA. 
Mr. Lundberg's fees were set by VA, FHA, FNMA and FHLMC at $450.00 to 
$550.00 per foreclosure. Only costs actually incurred were allowed. See fee charts. Dennis 
A. Jankowski, The National Mortgage Servicer's Reference Directory, Vernon Enterprises 
(17th Ed.), p. 1-22 & 1-23 FNMA fee chart, p. 2-14 & 2-15 FHLMC fee chart, p. 3-83 VA 
fee chart, p. 4-11 - 4-13, HUD (FHA) fee chart. R. 236-243. Lenders and servicing 
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companies also restricted his fees and his costs to the actual costs. In the Russells' situation, 
Lundberg was limited to the fees and costs allowed by FNMA pursuant to the contract 
between Aames, the lender/servicer, and Lundberg. Aames contract at R. 963. He was paid 
the maximum fee allowed by the FNMA guidelines. FNMA allowed only the actual costs 
incurred. He was paid more than what was allowed because his costs were bumped up by 
the kickbacks and administrative fees of his dummy corporation. 
Lundberg owed the Russells the duty to not charge more than allowed under the 
Aames contract and FNMA. He breached that duty. 
II. Fact issues exist that make summary judgment inappropriate. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Blodgett that whether a confidential 
relationship or fiduciary duty existed was an issue usually involving facts that had to be 
sorted out by the jury. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d at 302. Whether the foreclosing 
trustee in Blodgett owed a fiduciary duty to the trustors was a question of fact and summary 
judgment was held to be inappropriate. Id at 304. 
In Banberry Crossing, the Utah Supreme Court set forth a test of whether the trustee 
owed a fiduciary duty to the trustor. The Court expressly noted that the existence of such 
a duty would be implied from the factual situation of a particular case. First Sec. Bank of 
Utah. N.A. v. Banberry Crossing. 780 P.2d at 1256. 
The Russells set forth the following facts that should be viewed in a light most 
favorable to them. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah. 779 P.2d at 637:1) Lundberg 
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was the trustee under a trust deed that limited the costs that he could charge to his actual 
costs; 2) the Utah foreclosure statute limited his costs to actual costs; 3) the servicing 
contract with Aames limited the costs to actual costs; 4) he owed a duty of honesty towards 
the Russells and possibly the higher duty of a fiduciary; 5) he almost doubled the price of 
posting the foreclosure notices by assessing an administrative fee for Rodney Services, a 
corporation owned by him and his children (the profits of which went into his pocket); 6) 
Rodney charged a similar administrative fee for publishing the notices; 7) the only action 
taken by Rodney to earn the administrative fee was faxing the notices to the persons posting 
and publishing the notices, which action was the same taken by Lundberg's staff prior to 
Rodney's existence, and which action was part of the foreclosure process for which 
Lundberg was paid $550 for each foreclosure; 8) Lundberg took kickbacks from the 
Commercial Record for publishing his notices; 9) Lundberg took "commissions" from 
Backman-Stewart for providing the TSG's on his foreclosures, which commissions were 
substantial; 10) Lundberg admitted in the section on Utah foreclosure law that he wrote for 
the desk reference book used in the industry by other trustees that he was limited to 
collecting only his actual costs; 11) the regulations of FNMA, FHLMC, VA, FHA limited 
Lundberg to his actual costs; 12) he and Canyon Anderson of Backman-Stewart were 
worried about violating the Utah Insurance Code by splitting the premiums on the TSG's 
and were worried about an investigation by the Utah Insurance Department so they 
exchanged letters and prepared a contract that tried to hide the split of commissions by 
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claiming that Lundberg would sign the TSG's and perform title clearing work to justify the 
split of the TSG premiums; 13) Lundberg never signed the TSG's, they were signed by 
insurance agents of Backman-Stewart (this argument by Lundberg is irrelevant because the 
insurance code required that actual work be performed in searching the title before a 
premium could be split and Lundberg never searched titles); 14) Lundberg never performed 
title clearing work for Backman-Stewart, which work was required by the lenders such as 
Aames' requirement in its contract with Lundberg; 15) after this suit was filed and served, 
Lundberg and Backman-Stewart tried to hid the kickbacks for the TSG's even deeper by 
starting to pay Lundberg $ 15,000.00 per month for legal work (for which he never kept time 
sheets or allocated fees by project) and $4,000.00 per month as a salary as an officer of 
Backman-Stewart; and 16) the Russells and the other Utah borrowers whose homes were at 
risk of loss by Lundberg's foreclosures had to pay the artificially inflated fees in order to 
stop the foreclosures. 
The view of the foregoing facts in a light most favorable to the Russells leads one to 
believe that Lundberg violated the trust deed, violated Utah's foreclosure statute, violated 
the rules of FNMA, FHLMC, VA, and FHA, and violated the duty of honesty owed to the 
trustors. These facts also leads one to believe that Lundberg was in a fiduciary relationship 
with the trustors, including the Russells, because he stood in a dominant position by 
controlling the loss of their homes, he knew of the amount of the costs and what could be 
legally charged, and he knew that he was gouging the trustors. 
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The trial court ignored these facts and granted summary judgment. 
i n . In the alternative, Mr, Lundberg was unjustly enriched by collecting more costs 
than he actually incurred in the foreclosures. 
The Russells claim that Mr. Lundberg was unjustly enriched. The elements of unjust 
enrichment are: 1) the defendant received a benefit; 2) the defendant knew of the benefit; 
3) it is unjust under the circumstances for the defendant to retain the benefit Davies v. 
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987). 
However, unjust enrichment is available only where there is no remedy under a 
contract. Five F. v. Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d at 109. The trial court held that Mr. 
Lundberg was not a party to the contract, the trust deed. The Russells alleged unjust 
enrichment as an alternative cause of action if a contractual remedy at law was not available. 
The facts demonstrate that Mr. Lundberg received a benefit in the form of the inflated costs, 
he knew of the* benefit and that it is unjust for him to retain the benefit. If the Court 
determines that there is no contractual claim at law, then an equitable claim for unjust 
enrichment should be preserved. 
IV. The defendants violated the Utah Unfair Practices Act. 
The defendants argued that the Utah Unfair Practices Act ("UUPA") did not apply 
to the facts. The trial court agreed and dismissed the Russell's claim. 
The purpose of the UUPA is to prevent unfair competition, especially through 
discrimination in the price of a product that tends to substantially lessen competition or tends 
to create a monopoly. Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc. 146 P.2d 203 (Utah 1944); and Utah Code 
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Ann.§ 13-5-3(1 )(a). The Act only allows differentials in price where the differences are the 
result of cost savings in the creation of each item of product because of the large quantity 
of product that is ordered by a particular customer. Utah Code Ann.§ 13-5-3(l)(b)(I). In 
order to qualify for this exception, the cost of manufacture of each item must be decreased 
by the large quantity of product. Id. Where there is no savings in the cost of manufacture 
of a product because of the quantity, then a transaction is not exempt from the Act. Id. 
Lundberg argued that because of the large number of TSG's that he ordered, the cost 
of preparing them decreased and his commission is payment for this decrease. However, 
Lundberg offers no evidence of such a decrease. Logic also does not support his claim. The 
primary cost of the TSG's is the cost of the title search on the home that is being foreclosed. 
The steps that the title company needs to complete for each title search are the same 
regardless of the number of TSG's that are prepared. Each house and the state of its title is 
unique. The title needs to be searched on each house in the same manner whether one TSG 
is issued or 1,000 TSG's are issued on different properties. Thus, the TSG's do not qualify 
for the exemption of Section 13-5-3(l)(b)(I). 
The commissions or kickbacks paid to Lundberg by Backman-Stewart and also by 
the Intermountain Commercial Record substantially lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly. Lundberg handles thousands of foreclosures in the state of Utah each year. He 
sends all of his TSG work to Backman-Stewart because of the commission that he receives. 
The commission actually translates into a much lower price for the title work than the same 
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title product would cost from another title company. Because of the commission and the 
resulting lower price, Lundberg has chosen to send all of his TSG work to Backman-
Stewart. This has created a monopoly for the TSG work on thousands of foreclosures each 
year in the state of Utah. The other title companies cannot compete because they will not 
engage in the illegal kickbacks paid to Lundberg. 
The defendants argued that the Russells do not have standing to complain about the 
violation of the Act. He correctly points out that the Russells do not sell TSGs. He also 
argues that they are not purchasers of TSGs. He contends that Lundberg is the purchaser. 
Yet, the Russells and the other borrowers who ultimately pay Lundberg' s inflated TSG costs 
in order to save their homes are the parties who are actually purchasing the TSGs. They pay 
for the TSGs. Lundberg does not. Lundberg passes the cost of the TSGs on to them, albeit 
an inflated cost that does not account for the kickback that Lundberg receives for the TSGs. 
Rodney argued that it was not involved in anti-competitive acts that would make it 
liable under the UUPA. Rodney, however, is the conduit through which kickbacks and 
illegal discounts for posting and publication by the Commercial Record are funneled to 
Lundberg or his family. These kickbacks are not offered to other attorneys who publish 
their legal notices with the Commercial Record. Neither are the posting discounts offered 
to others. 
Rodney is liable for this price discrimination. Indeed, Utah Code Ann.§ 13-5-6 
expressly ties any person or entity who aids or abets in the discrimination to liability for the 
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scheme. 
V. The defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy. 
The trial court dismissed the Russell's claim for civil conspiracy because it ruled that 
the acts of the defendants were lawful. 
A elements of a civil conspiracy are: 1) the combination of two or more persons; 2) 
with an object to be accomplished; 3) a meeting of the minds to accomplish the object; 4) 
one or more unlawful, overt acts; and 5) damages. Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon. 746 P.2d 
785, 790 (Utah 1987). Mr. Lundberg, Mr. Anderson, and their companies engaged in a 
scheme to kickback portions of the premiums on TSGs. The kickbacks resulted in a cost of 
the TSG's much less than their cost assessed to the borrowers/trustors in order to save their 
homes from foreclosure. Mr. Lundberg and Rodney engaged in a scheme of phoney, 
unnecessary administrative expenses that almost doubled the price of posting the foreclosure 
notices. Mr. Lundberg, Rodney and the Commercial Record engaged in a scheme of similar 
unnecessary administrative expenses and kickbacks that inflated the cost of publication. 
These acts were overt and, as argued above, unlawful. A civil conspiracy occurred. 
VI, Punitive damages should be awarded against Mr. Lundberg. 
The trial court dismissed the claim for punitive damages. 
Punitive damages may be awarded if the Russells establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that Mr. Lundberg's acts were willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward their rights. 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 78-18-1. Mr. Lundberg knew that he was limited to collecting only actual 
costs incurred in his foreclosures. He held himself out as an expert in the industry. He 
prepared a summary of Utah foreclosure law in The National Mortgage Servicer's Reference 
Directory, a desk book used by other trustees in their foreclosures. He wrote in the Directory 
that "[t]he lender may recover fees, costs and advances provided they are reasonable, 
actually incurred and permitted by the documents." [Emphasis added.] R.927. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Mr. Lundberg formed a dummy corporation owned by his 
family to hid unnecessary administrative fees that doubled the cost of posting. The 
corporation also took kick backs from the Commercial Record for publication and charged 
a similar unnecessary administrative fee for faxing the notice to the Commercial Record. 
Mr. Lundberg and Canyon Anderson of Backman-Stewart created a commission, 
which was simply a kickback, for the large volume of TSG work provided by Lundberg. 
These commissions hid the actual cost of the TSGs to Mr. Lundberg which was much lower 
than the costs charged to the borrowers/trustors. They changed the form of the kickbacks 
several times in response to the state of Utah's investigation of their splitting of title 
insurance premiums and in response to this lawsuit. 
The elements of punitive damages exist in this case. The jury should have the right 
to consider such damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the decision of the trial court, reinstate the claims of the 
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Russells, and remand the matter for trial. 
Dated this ffiJ-day of July, 2003. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Code Ann.§§ 57-1-20 to 34. 
2. Memorandum Decision filed September 30, 2002. 
3. Order Dismissing Without Prejudice Certain Claims Against the Backman 
Defendants filed October 10, 2002. 
4. Partial Summary Judgment for Lundberg Defendants filed October 30, 2002. 
5. Memorandum Decision filed August 14, 2003. 
6. Order Granting the Lundberg Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
Remaining Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, Granting Rodney Service Co.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting the Backman Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings, and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class filed September 8,2003. 
7. Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of the Backman Stewart Defendants on 
Remaining Claims filed October 1, 2003. 
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CONVEYANCES 57-1-20 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a t rust deed 
as security for the performance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections 
57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust 
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person 
named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed 
by trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 57-1-1. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the t rust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1; 1988, ch. 
155, § 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ance by which title to the trust property passes 
to the trustee. Upon default, the trustee has 
Mortgage distinguished.
 p o w e r t o s e l l t h e p r 0 p e r t y to satisfy the trus-
Trustee must be identified in instrument.
 t o r ' s d e b t t o t h e beneficiary. First Sec. Bank v. 
Morteatre d is t inguished Banberry Crossing, 780 R2d 1253 (Utah 1989); 
Mortgage a i s tmguisnea . Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 
Unlike a trust deed, a mortgage in Utah is
 1 1 A 1 /TT, u n, A innr^ 
,.., . \ t rpu , 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
not a title-conveying instrument. The mort- *^ 
gagor retains legal title, and the mortgagee's Trustee must be identified in instrument. 
interest is a lien on the property to secure Purported deed of t rust recorded by savings 
payment of a debt. General Glass Corp. v. Mast and loan association was ineffective as a title-
Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). conveying instrument where it did not identify 
A trust deed is similar to a mortgage in that or name the trustee, who was the grantee 
it is given as security for the performance of an under the deed. General Glass Corp. v. Mast 
obligation. However, a t rust deed is a convey- Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 54A Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 5 et seq. 
§ 146 et seq. 
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property — Purposes — 
Effect. 
Transfers in t rust of real property may be made to secure the performance of 
an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the t rust deed to a 
beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the t rust property 
acquired by the trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent to the 
execution of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for the 
obligation or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed in like 
manner as if acquired before execution of the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 6. 
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57-1-21 REAL ESTATE 
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications. 
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any member of the Utah State Bar; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or 
insurance company authorized to do business in Utah under the laws 
of Utah or the United States; 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a t rust business in Utah 
under the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(iv) any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do 
business in Utah under the laws of Utah; 
(v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation which is licensed, chartered, or 
regulated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor, 
(b) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a t rust deed existing 
prior to the effective date of this chapter, nor to any agreement that is 
supplemental to that trust deed. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, 
unless the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), 
(iii), (v), or (vi). 
tion" in Subsection (l)(a)(ii); and made related 
and stylistic changes. 
"Effective date of th is chapter." — The 
phrase "effective date of this chapter," in Sub-
section (l)(b), first appeared in this section as 
amended by L. 1985, ch. 64, § 1. That act (L 
1985, ch. 64) took effect on April 29, 1985. 
Cross-References. — Utah State Bar, § 78-
51-1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J .S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 5, 78. 
57-1-22. Successor trustees — Appointment by benefi-
ciary — Effect — Substitution of trustee — Re-
cording — Form. 
(1) The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for 
record in the office of the county recorder of each county in which the trust 
property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the 
time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the 
power, duties, authority, and title of the trustee named in the deed of trust and 
of any successor trustee. 
(2) The substitution shall: 
(a) identify the trust deed by stating the names of the original parties 
thereto, the date of recordation, and the book and page where the same is 
recorded or the entry number; 
(b) include the legal description of the trust property; 
(c) state the name of the new trustee; and 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 3; 1963, ch. 
110, § 1; 1969, ch . 162, § 1; 1985, ch. 64, § 1; 
1996, ch. 182, § 25. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1996 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1996, added the Subsec-
tion (l)(a) and (l)(b) designations, redesignat-
ing former Subsections (l)(a) to (f) as (l)(a)(i) to 
(vi); substituted "depository institution as de-
fined in Section 7-1-103" for "bank, building 
and loan association, savings and loan associa-
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CONVEYANCES 57-1-23 
(d) be executed and acknowledged by all of the beneficiaries under the 
trust deed or their successors in interest 
(3) l i not previously recorded, at ftie time 01 recording *^ e notice of deiauYt, 
t k e successor trustee shall file for record the substitution of trustee, and a copy 
there°f shall be sent in the manner provided m Section #7-1-26 to all persons 
t 0 w nom a copy of the notice of default would be required to be mailed by 
Section 57 1-26 In addition thereto, a copy shall be sent to the prior trustee by 
regul a r rnail to his last-known address 
(4) A substitution of trustee shall be sufficient if mad^ m substantially the 
following form 
Substitution of Trustee 
(insert name and address of new t r u s t s ) 
1S hereby appointed successor trustee under the t rust deed executed by 
y as trustor, m which is named benenc* a r v a n d as 
trustee, and filed for record (month/day/year), and recorded m Book 
_, Page , Records of County, (or filed for record 
, (month/day/year), with recorder's entry No > 
County), Utah 
(Insert legal description) 
Signature ^ 
(Certificate of Acknowledgment) 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 4; 1981, ch. ment, effective May *> 2000, updated the date 
100, § 1; 1989, ch. 88, § 1; 2000, ch. 75, § 23. lines in the form in Subsection (4) 
A m ^ 1 1 d i n e n t Notes . — The 2000 amend 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C J S Mortgages § 79 
57-1-23. Sale of trust property — Power of trustee — 
Foreclosure of trust deed* 
A power of sale is hereby conferred upon the trustee which the trustee may 
exercise and under which the t rust property may be sold m ^ n e manner 
hereinafter provided, after a breach of an obligation f ° r which the t rust 
property 1S conveyed as security, or, at the option of th£ beneficiary, a t rus t 
deed m a v be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property The power of sale may be exe r c i s e a < by the trustee 
without express provision therefor in the trust deed 
History: L 1961, ch 181, § 5. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joint tenancies 
Mortgage foreclosure method 
Procedural requirements 
Cited 
Joint tenancies . 
The rule that a joint tenancy is severed by 
one tenant 's conveyance applies not only to 
voluntary conveyances, but also to involuntary 
conveyances pursuant to judicial rules Jolley v 
Cony, 671 P 2d 139 (Utah 1983) 
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obhga 
tion to a mortgagee, her subsequent purchase 
of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to 
be for the benefit of all cotenants Jolley v 
Cony, 671 P2d 139 (Utah 1983) 
Mortgage foreclosure method. 
Defendant could not claim error where plain-
tiff sought to foreclose on a t rus t deed in the 
manner provided for foreclosure of mortgages, 
even though, in selecting the alternative rem 
edy, plaintiff obtained costs and attorney fees 
far in excess of those provided for in § 57 1 31 
Secunty Title Co v Payless Bldrs Supply, 17 
Utah 2d 179, 407 P2d 141 (1965) 
Procedural requirements . 
The detailed procedural requirements for a 
trustee's sale of real property under §§ 57 1 23 
through 57 1 34 are intended to protect the 
debtor/trustor, and provide protections that 
substitute for the six month n g h t of redemp-
tion guaranteed in judicial mortgage foreclo-
sures Jones v Johnson, 761 P2d 37 (Utah Ct 
App 1988) 
Cited in Timm 
990 P 2d 942 
v Dewsnup, 1999 UT 105, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C J S Mortgages §§ 599, 600 
AX.R. — Failure to keep up insurance as 
justifying foreclosure under acceleration provi-
sion in mortgage or deed of trust , 69 A L R 3d 
774 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice of 
default. 
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may not be exercised until 
(1) the trustee first files for record, in the office of the recorder of each 
county where the t rust property or some part or parcel thereof is situated, 
a notice of default, identifying the t rust deed by stating the name of the 
trustor named therein and giving the book and page where the trust deed 
is recorded and a legal description of the t rust property, and containing a 
statement that a breach of an obligation for which the t rust property was 
conveyed as security has occurred, and setting forth the nature of that 
breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold the property to satisfy 
the obligation, 
(2) not less than three months has thereafter elapsed; and 
(3) after the lapse of at least three months the trustee shall give notice 
of sale as provided m this act 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, * 6; 1967, ch. 
131, § 1; 1989, ch. 88, § 2. 
Meaning of "this act." — Laws 1961, ch 
181 enacted §§ 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Three-month time period 
Cited 
Three-month t ime period. 
Former Bankruptcy Rule 601 (see now 11 
U S C § 362), which provides that the filing of 
a bankruptcy petition shall operate as a stay of 
any act to enforce a hen against property l 
custody of the bankruptcy court, does not su 
pend the running of the three-month time p e 
nod required by this section McCarthy 
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Lewis, 615 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1980). protections the statutory requirements for a 
Trustee's sale was upheld, even though notice nonjudicial foreclosure were intended to en-
0f the sale was mailed only two months after an sure. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. 
amended notice of default was recorded, be- Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah C t App. 1990). 
cause there was no showing that the procedural 
irregularity resulted from fraud or unfair deal- Cited in Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210 
ing, and all parties were afforded the rights and (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59AC.J.S. Mortgages § 621 et seq. 
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of proper ty 
— Time and place of sale. 
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the time and place of sale 
particularly describing the property to be sold: 
(a) by publication of the notice, at least three times, once a week for 
three consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least ten days but not 
more than 30 days prior to the sale, in some newspaper having a general 
circulation in each county in which the property to be sold, or some part 
thereof, is situated; and 
(b) by posting the notice, at least 20 days before the date of sale, in some 
conspicuous place on the property to be sold and also in at least three 
public places of each city or county in which the property to be sold, or 
some par t thereof, is situated. 
(2) The sale shall be held at the time and place designated in the notice of 
sale which shall be between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. and at the 
courthouse of the county in which the property to be sold, or some part thereof, 
is situated. 
(3) The notice of sale shall be sufficient if made in substantially the 
following form: 
Notice of Trustee's Sale 
The following described property will be sold at public auction to the highest 
bidder, payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale, at the 
in , County, Utah, on (month/day/year), 
at m. of said day, for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed executed by 
. and , his wife, as trustors, in favor of , covering real 
property located at , and more particularly described as: 
(Insert legal description) 
(Certificate of Acknowledgment, if recorded) 
Dated (month/day/year). 
Trustee 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 7; 1981, ch. ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
100, § 2; 1989, ch. 88, § 3; 2000, ch. 75, § 24. lines in the form in Subsection (3) and made 
Amendment Notes . — The 2000 amend- stylistic changes. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Error in not ice . place on October 28, 1982, where the notice did 
not confuse bidders or result in an undervalu 
—Validity of sale .
 a t l o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y Concepts, Inc v First Sec 
Validity of a sale was not affected by a typo-
 R e a l t y g e r v s ? I n c ? 4 3 p 2 d n 5 g ( U f c a h 1 9 8 ? > 
graphical error in a notice dated October 1, 
1983, which indicated that the sale would take 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C J S Mortgages § 608 et seq 
57-1-26. Requests for copies of notice of default and no-
tice of sale — Mailing by trustee or beneficiary — 
Publication of notice of default. 
(1) (a) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of default and of any notice 
of sale under any t rust deed may, at any time subsequent to the filing for 
record of the t rust deed and prior to the filing for record of a notice of 
default thereunder, file for record in the office of the county recorder of any 
county in which any part or parcel of the t rust property is situated, a duly 
acknowledged request for a copy of any notice of default and notice of sale 
The request shall set forth the name and address of the person or persons 
requesting copies of such notices and shall identify the trust deed by 
stating the names of the original parties thereto, the date of filing for 
record thereof, the book and page where the same is recorded or the 
recorder's entry number, and the legal description of the trust property 
The request shall be in substantially the following form: 
REQUEST FOR NOTICE 
Request is hereby made that a copy of any notice of default and a copy 
of notice of sale under the trust deed filed for record .— 
(month/day/year), and recorded in Book , Page , Records 
of County, (or filed for record (month/day/year), with 
recorder's entry number , County), Utah, executed by 
as trustor, in which is named as beneficiary and 
as trustee, be mailed to (insert name) at 
(insert address) 
(Insert legal description) 
Signature —-— 
(Certificate of Acknowledgement) 
(b) Upon filing for record of a request for notice, the recorder shall index 
the request in the mortgagor's index, mortgagee's index, and abstract 
record. Except as provided in this section, the trustee under any such deed 
of t rust is not required to send notice of default or notice of sale to any 
person not filing a request for notice as described herein. 
(2) Not later than ten days after recordation of a notice of default, the 
trustee or beneficiary shall mail, by certified or registered mail, with postage 
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prepaid, a copy of such notice with the recording date shown thereon, 
addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a request 
therefor which has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of 
default, directed to the address designated in the request. At least 20 days 
before the date of sale, the trustee shall mail, by certified or registered mail, 
with postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of the time and place of sale, 
addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a request 
therefor which has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of 
default, directed to the address designated in the request. 
(3) Any trust deed may contain a request that a copy of any notice of default 
and a copy of any notice of sale thereunder be mailed to any person a party 
thereto at the address of the person set forth therein, and a copy of any notice 
of default and of any notice of sale shall be mailed to each such person at the 
same time and in the same manner required as though a separate request 
therefor had been filed by each of such persons as provided in this section. 
(4) If no address of the trustor is set forth in the trust deed and if no request 
for notice by the trustor has been recorded as provided in this section, a copy 
of the notice of default shall be published at least three times, once a week for 
three consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in each county 
in which the trust property, or some part thereof, is situated, such publication 
to commence not later than ten days after the filing for record of the notice of 
default. In lieu of this publication, a copy of the notice of default may be 
delivered personally to the trustor within the ten days or at any time before 
publication is completed. 
(5) No request for a copy of any notice filed for record pursuant to this 
section, nor any statement or allegation in any such request, nor any record 
thereof, shall affect the title to trust property or be considered notice to any 
person that any person requesting copies of notice of default or of notice of sale 
has or claims any right, title or interest in, or lien or claim upon, the trust 
property. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 8; 1980, ch. 57, ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
§ 1; 1981, ch. 100, § 3; 1989, ch. 88, § 4; 2000, lines in the form in Subsection (l)(a) and made 
ch. 75, § 25. stylistic changes. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 2000 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in First Sec. Bank v. Felger, 658 F. 
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987); Hall v. NACM Inter-
mountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, 988 F.2d 942. 
57-1-27. Sale of trust property by public auction — Post-
ponement of sale. 
(1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, 
the trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public 
auction to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may 
conduct the sale and act as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in 
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which the t rust property 
shall be sold, if the property consists of several known lots or parcels which can 
be sold to advantage separately. The trustee or attorney for the trustee shall 
follow these directions. Any person, including the beneficiary or trustee, may 
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bid at the sale Each bid is considered an irrevocable offer, and if the purchaser 
refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property sold to him at the sale, 
the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may again sell the property at any 
time to the highest bidder The party refusing to pay the bid price is liable for 
any loss occasioned by the refusal, including interest, costs, and trustee's and 
reasonable attorneys' fees The trustee or the attorney for the trustee may 
thereafter reject any other bid of that person 
(2) The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he considers expedi 
ent, postpone the sale up to a period not to exceed 72 hours If the last hour of 
the postponement falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the sale 
may be postponed until the same hour of the next day which is not a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday The person conducting the sale shall give notice 
of the postponement by public declaration at the time and place last appointed 
for the sale No other notice of the postponed sale is required, unless the sale 
is postponed for longer than 72 hours beyond the date designated in the notice 
of sale In the event of a longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and 
renoticed in the same manner as the original notice of sale is required to be 
given 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 9; 1985, ch. 68, 
§ 1; 1988, ch. 82, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Fair market value bid. the trustee was required by the statute to 
A trust deed beneficiary's offer of "fair market accept it Thus the trustee was not permitted 
value" for property sold at a trustee's sale was to postpone, cancel, or renotice the sale pursu 
the equivalent of a fixed dollar offer and was ant to Subsection (2) Thomas v Johnson 801 
therefore a bid for purposes of Subsection (1) P2d 186 (Utah Ct App 1990) 
As the only bid, it was also the highest bid, and 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C J S Mortgages § 622 et seq property subject to order of foreclosure and sale 
A.L.R. — Mortgagor's interference with as contempt of court 54 A L R 3d 1242 
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee — Payment of 
bid — Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser —-
Recitals — Effect. 
(1) The purchaser at the sale shall pay the price bid as directed by the 
trustee and upon receipt of payment, the trustee shall execute and deliver his 
deed to such purchaser The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance 
with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the 
exercise of the power of sale and sale of the property described therein, 
including recitals concerning any mailing, personal delivery, and publication of 
the notice of default, any mailing and the publication and posting of the notice 
of sale, and the conduct of sale These recitals constitute prima facie evidence 
of such compliance and are conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers 
and encumbrancers for value and without notice 
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right 
of redemption, the trustee's title and all right, title, interest, and claim of the 
trustor and his successors in interest and of all persons claiming by, through, 
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or under them, in and to the property sold, including all such right, title, 
interest, and claim in and to such property acquired by the trustor or his 
successors in interest subsequent to the execution of the t rust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 10; 1985, ch. 
68, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty 
Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 645 et seq. 
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale — Disposition. 
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, first, to the costs 
and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the 
payment of the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed the 
amount which may be provided for in the trust deed, second, to payment of the 
obligation secured by the t rust deed, and the balance, if any, to the person or 
persons legally entitled to the proceeds, or the trustee, in his discretion, may 
deposit the balance of the proceeds with the clerk of the district court of the 
county in which the sale took place. Upon depositing the balance, the trustee 
shall be discharged from all further responsibility and the clerk shall deposit 
the proceeds with the state treasurer subject to the order of the district court. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 11; 1997, ch. before "clerk" and inserted "district court of 
215, § 7. the" near the end of the first sentence; substi-
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- tuted "state" for "county" in the second sen-
ment, effective July 1, 1997, deleted "county" tence; and made stylistic changes throughout. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Duties of trustee. order to assist certain interest holders at the 
A trustee under t rus t deed has an affirmative expense of others. Randall v. Valley Title, 681 
duty to uphold his statutory responsibilities, P.2d 219 (Utah 1984). 
and may not ignore those responsibilities in 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 664 et seq. 
57-1-30, Sale of trust property by trustee — Corporate 
stock evidencing water rights given to secure 
trust deed. 
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights used, intended to be used, 
or suitable for use on the t rust property and which are hypothecated to secure 
an obligation secured by a trust deed may be sold with the t rust property, or 
any part thereof, at the trustee's sale in the manner provided in this act. 
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History: L. 1961, ch. 181, & 12. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
same catchhne following § 57-1-24 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obliga-
tions secured — Reinstatement — Cancellation 
of recorded notice of default. 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured 
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, become 
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the performance 
of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in the payment 
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the 
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the t rust deed, taxes, 
assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in 
accordance with terms of the obligation or of the t rust deed, the trustor or his 
successor in interest in the trust property or any part thereof or any other 
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon or any 
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within three months of 
the filing for record of notice of default under the t rust deed, if the power of sale 
is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or his successor in interest the 
entire amount then due under the terms of the t rust deed (including costs and 
expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust 
deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other than that 
portion of the principal as would not then be due had no default occurred, and 
thereby cure the default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all proceedings 
theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the 
obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force 
and effect the same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the t rus t deed reinstated in the manner 
provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand of 
any person having an interest in the t rust property, execute and deliver to him 
a request to the trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of 
the recorded notice of default under the t rust deed; and any beneficiary under 
a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after such demand, 
refuses to request the trustee to execute and deliver this cancellation is liable 
to the person entitled to such request for all damages resulting from this 
refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee or beneficiary, or both, 
or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a cancellation of a notice of 
default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a trust 
deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is sufficient if made 
and executed by the trustee in substantially the following form: 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record 
(month/day/year), and recorded in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record (month/day/year), with record-
er's entry No , County), Utah, which notice of default refers to 
the t rust deed executed by as trustor, in which is named as 
beneficiary and as trustee, and filed for record 
(month/day/year), and recorded in Book , Page , Records of _———--
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County, (or filed of record 
jvfo. . , County), Utah. 
(month/day/year), with recorder's entry 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 13; 1967, ch. 
131, § 2; 1981, ch. 100, § 4; 1985, ch. 68, § 3; 
2000, ch. 75, § 26. 
Amendment No tes . — The 2000 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
lines in the form in Subsection (2) and made 
stylistic changes throughout the section. 










The 1985 amendment to this section could 
not be retroactively applied to a contractual 
transaction entered into before the amend-
ment, where the amendment affected the debt-
or's substantive contractual rights by eliminat-
ing his right to cure a default under his t rust 
deed and note by paying only the amount in 
default. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood 
Assocs., 795 P.2d 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Effect 
The 1985 amendment of this section changed 
the law to require the debtor to pay the entire 
amount of the note in order to cure his default 
in a judicial foreclosure proceeding. Washing-
ton Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 R2d 
665 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Debt acceleration. 
Debt acceleration is a substantive right be-
cause it provides a beneficiary with the power 
to bring a single foreclosure action upon de-
fault, thereby satisfying the entire obligation 
and discharging the note, rather than bringing 
repeated collection actions each time a trustor 
defaults. The beneficiary thereby avoids the 
burden of repeated foreclosures as well as the 
nsk that the security for the debt, the property, 
will be consumed by legal fees, court costs, 
unpaid interest, etc., before the debt is satis-
fied. Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 
P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"Deacceleration" is the undoing of the accel-
eration itself. The parties are returned to their 
preacceleration status as if the beneficiary of 
the trust deed had not opted to accelerate the 
entire debt. The default, however, remains un-
changed and the notice of default would still be 
in effect. A beneficiary could still foreclose, but 
it would only be for the amount of the delin-
quent payments, costs, and so forth. The note 
would remain in effect to the extent not satis-
fied from the sale proceeds and the trustor 
would retain any property not sold to satisfy 
the delinquency. Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. 
Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Default not cured. 
The plaintiff had no duty to fulfill his offer to 
treat the defendants' default as cured when 
that offer was predicated upon payment of the 
arrearage, taxes, and insurance, and only the 
arrearage had been paid. Grossen v. DeWitt, 
1999 UT App 167, 982 P.2d 581. 
Reinstatement. 
"Reinstatement," as it is used in this section, 
is the curing of the default. In other words, the 
parties are returned to their former status as if 
the default had never occurred. If a trustor 
subsequently defaults again, the beneficiary 
must begin new foreclosure proceedings. It may 
not rely on the previous notice of default and 
declaration of acceleration. Progressive Acqui-
sition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 547. 
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57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to 
recover balance due upon obligation for which 
trust deed was given as security — Collection of 
costs and attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust 
deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, 
and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such 
property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale Before 
rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the date of 
sale of the property sold The court may not render judgment for more than the 
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and 
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair 
market value of the property as of the date of the sale In any action brought 
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch. 







One action rule 
Out of s tate lands 
Preemption by federal law 
Prevailing party 
Procedural failure 
Purpose of section 
Cited 
Attorney fees . 
Trial court did not err in granting debtors 
attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party, 
because, although a judgment was entered 
against them, they prevailed on the only con-
tested issue at trial Occidental/Nebraska Fed 
Sav Bank v Mehr, 791 P2d 217 (Utah Ct App 
1990) 
Deficiency judgment . 
When a creditor takes more than one item of 
security upon an obligation secured by a t rust 
deed, the creditor is not precluded from making 
use of that additional security merely because 
the creditor has not sought a deficiency judg-
ment within three months of a nonjudicial sale 
of one of the items covered by the trust deed 
property, nor is the creditor required to seek a 
deficiency judgment under this section in order 
to maintain its right to the additional security, 
so long as the security is applied toward the 
debt owed on the original loan Phillips v Utah 
State Credit Union, 811 P2d 174 (Utah 1991) 
A "sold out nonforeclosing junior lienor," who 
became unsecured by a senior lienor's foreclo 
sure, was not pursuing a "deficiency judgment" 
and therefore, was not limited by the fair 
market value provision of this section from 
pursuing its claim against the debtor person 
ally City Consumer Servs , Inc v Peters, 815 
P2d 234 (Utah 1991) 
The protections of the Utah Trust Deed Act 
(§§ 57 1 19 to 57 1 36) apply to any action to 
recover the balance due on an obligation se 
cured by a trust deed, following a nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale, and makes no distinction 
whether it is brought against the debtor or a 
guarantor, thus , the three month statute of 
limitations applied to bar an action against the 
guarantors of an obligation and, even if the 
action had been timely filed, the fair value 
credit would have required plaintiff to credit 
the fair market value toward the deficiency 
preventing a double recovery from defendants 
as either guarantors or debtors Surety L" e 
Ins Co v Smith, 892 P2d 1 (Utah 1995) 
Exclusive remedy. 
This section provides the exclusive remedy 
for securing a deficiency judgment following a 
sale of real property under a t rust deed, thereby 
precluding the pursuance of any other r e r n e ^ 
once the sale has been made Cox v Green, 69 
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P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985); Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 
1987). 
Multiple l iens. 
The burden of protecting property subject to 
multiple liens is on the debtor, not on the junior 
lienholder. Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134 
(Utah 1992). 
Notice. 
The primary purpose of the three-month 
limitation period contained in this section is 
satisfied when the foreclosing party provides 
notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be 
sought by filing the action. Standard Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 
1991). 
One-action rule. 
A pretrial stipulation between a debtor and 
the debtor's junior lienholder to limit the junior 
lienholder's judgment to the difference between 
the debt owed and the fair market value of the 
property at the time of sale was meant to apply 
to the deficiency judgment after sale, as pro-
vided by this section, so when the trial court 
later ruled that the junior lienholders were 
entitled to collect against the underlying obli-
gation, as their security had been extinguished 
through the intervening trustee's sale by the 
senior lienholder, the one-action rule (§ 78-37-
1) did not limit the junior lienholder's judgment 
because defendants' conduct was not blamewor-
thy. Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134 (Utah 
1992). 
Out-of-state lands. 
Deficiency judgment protection requiring 
that fair market value of property at time of 
sale be used as setoff is not extended to debtors 
whose obligations are secured by trust deeds on 
land outside Utah. Bullington v. Mize, 25 Utah 
2d 173, 478 P.2d 500, 44 A.L.R.3d 910 (1970). 
Preemption by federal law. 
The three-month limitation of this section 
could not be used to bar the Small Business 
Administration's post-foreclosure deficiency ac-
tion against guarantor, as to do so would violate 
the well-established maxim that the United 
States is exempt from application of state stat-
utes of limitation. United States v. Johnson, 
946 F. Supp. 915 (D. Utah 1996). 
Prevai l ing party. 
If a party seeking a deficiency judgment can 
convince the court that the debt exceeds the fair 
market value of the property, then that party is 
entitled to a deficiency judgment and prevails 
under this section; however, if the party defend-
ing such an action successfully maintains that 
the fair market value of the property equals or 
exceeds the total indebtedness, then that party 
prevails. First S.W. Fin. v. Sessions, 875 P.2d 
553 (Utah 1994). 
Procedural failure. 
This section, which gives a creditor three 
months after a sale of property under a trust 
deed to bring an action for any amounts re-
maining unpaid, does not permanently bar fur-
ther proceedings any time some procedural 
failing results in the dismissal of a properly 
filed action. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Kirkbride, 821 R2d 1136 (Utah 1991). • 
Purpose of sect ion. 
The purpose of this section is to protect the 
debtor, who in a nonjudicial foreclosure has no 
right of redemption, from a creditor who could 
purchase the property at the sale for a low price 
and then hold the debtor liable for a large 
deficiency. First Sec. Bank v. Felger, 658 F. 
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987). 
This section limits only the rights of the 
beneficiary under the trust deed that was fore-
closed — it does not affect the rights and 
obligations of parties to other t rust deeds. The 
statute does not purport to address the status 
of obligations secured by junior trust deeds 
following a trustee sale pursuant to a senior 
trust deed. G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. 
Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
By its terms and legislative ^history, this 
section provides a remedy for a creditor facing a 
defaulting debtor; where debtors did not de-
fault on creditor's mortgage, section was inap-
plicable. Associates Fin. Servs. v. Slaugh, 850 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993). 
Cited in Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375 (Utah 1988); Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 
186 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Citicorp Mtg., Inc. v. 
Hardy 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992); SLC Ltd. V v. 
Bradford Group W., Inc., 152 Bankr. 755 
(Bankr. D. Utah 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 674 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Excessiveness or adequacy of attor-
neys' fees in matters involving real estate, 10 
A.L.R.5th 448. 
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57-1-33 REAL ESTATE 
57-1-33. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Laws 1994, ch 172, § 2 repeals upon satisfaction of an obligation secured by a 
§ 57-1-33, as enacted by Laws 1961, ch 181, t rust deed, effective May 2, 1994 
§ 15, requiring reconveyance of trust property 
57-1-33.1. Reconveyance of a trust deed, 
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the 
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust 
property. 
(b) At the time the beneficiary requests a reconveyance under Subsec-
tion (l)(a), the beneficiary shall deliver to the trustee or the trustee's 
successor in interest the trust deed and the note or other evidence that the 
obligation securing the trust deed has been satisfied. 
(2) The reconveyance under Subsection (1) may designate the grantee as 
"the person or persons entitled thereto." 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-33.1, enacted by L. 
1995, ch. 185, § 1. 
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee — Foreclosure 
of trust deed — Limitation of actions. 
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made, or an action 
to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on 
real property shall be commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the 
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch . 181, § 16. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C J S Mortgages § 603 
57-1-35. Trust deeds — Transfer of secured debts as trans-
fer of security. 
The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer 
of the security therefor. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 17. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C J S Mortgages § 336 et seq 
57-1-36. Trust deeds — Instruments entitled to be re-
corded — Assignment of a beneficial interest. 
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a beneficial interest 
under a trust deed, notice of default, trustee's deed, reconveyance 
of the trust 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAKES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE 
RUSSELL, for themselves and for 
all other similarly situated 
individuals and entities, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
J. SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG & 
ASSOCIATES, a Professional 
Corporation; BACKMAN TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; 
BACKMAN-STEWART TITLE SERVICES, 
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership 
CANYON ANDERSON; RODNEY SERVICE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 020901052 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on August 22, 
2002, in connection with the Lundberg Parties' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Defendants Backman Title Company, Backman-
Stewart Title Services, Ltd. and Canyon Anderson's Motion to 
Dismiss, At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court indicated 
that it would take the matter under advisement to further consider 
the arguments, the relevant case law and statutes and the written 
submissions of the parties. Since taking the Motions under 
advisement, the Court has had an opportunity to consider or 
reconsider the law, all relevant pleadings, facts and the oral 
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arguments in this case. Now being fully advised, the Court enters 
the following Memorandum Decision. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Court first considers the Lundberg parties1 Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. This Motion pertains to the first four 
causes of action asserted in the plaintiffs1 Complaint: Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty, Constructive Fraud (as a result of the alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty), Breach of Contract and Breach of the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
The first issue before the Court is whether the plaintiffs can 
establish as a matter of law that defendant J. Scott Lundberg, the 
trustee under their Trust Deed, owed them a fiduciary duty. After 
carefully reviewing all of the cases cited by both sides, the Court 
determines that a fiduciary relationship can arise between a 
trustee and a trustor, but only under certain circumstances. 
To be precise, the case of Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1978), stands for the premise that a fiduciary relationship 
between a trustee and a trustor arises only when the trustee and 
trustor have a confidential relationship. In other words, there 
must be more to the relationship between the trustee and trustor 
than the "mere utilization of trust deed in the loan transaction." 
Id. at 302. 
RUSSELL V. LUNDBERG PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In Blodqett, the confidential relationship was established 
because the trustors (the Blodgetts) had a "significant previous 
business history as borrowers and depositors" at the bank, that was 
the original trustee under the Blodgetts' trust deed. Id. at 3 00. 
The court emphasized that the Blodgetts and the bank were not 
"strangers." Based on this set of facts, the court found a 
confidential relationship and therefore a fiduciary relationship to 
have existed between the bank and the Blodgetts. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs and Mr. 
Lundberg were complete strangers. They had never met and had no 
relationship whatsoever. As the Lundberg parties' counsel pointed 
out during oral argument, Mr. Lundberg was just a name to the 
plaintiffs. Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds as a 
matter of law that Mr. Lundberg (and, as a corollary, the remaining 
Lundberg parties) had no confidential relationship with the 
plaintiffs. In the absence of such a relationship, the Court 
concludes as a matter of law that the Lundberg parties had no 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs. 
The Court wants to make it clear that in reaching this 
conclusion, the Court considered, but was unpersuaded by the 
plaintiff's argument that a fiduciary relationship automatically 
arises simply by virtue of the trustee holding that title. The 
Court was similarly unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that 
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£he trust deed foreclosure statutes have the primary purpose of 
protecting the trustor and therefore impose an independent 
fiduciary duty. To -the contrary, the Court agrees with the 
Lundberg parties that it is the protection of the beneficiary that 
is the focus of these statutes. Moreover, the few procedural 
duties (not fiduciary duties) that are set forth in the statute 
that may be construed as being for the protection of the trustor 
(such as giving notice and selling the foreclosed property to the 
highest bidder, etc.) were all complied with in this case. 
Accordingly, having found that the Lundberg parties owed no 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs, the Court grants their Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment as to the first two causes of action. 
The Court next considers the plaintiffs1 claims that the 
Lundberg parties had a contractual duty and the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing. The Court determines that Mr. Lundberg, as the 
trustee, was not a contracting party with the plaintiffs, but 
merely a facilitator of the contract between the plaintiffs and the 
beneficiary of the trust deed. Mr. Lundberg gave no consideration 
on this contract and asked for none. In general, Mr. Lundberg did 
not bargain with respect to the contract and only became aware of 
the trust deed when the plaintiffs defaulted and the beneficiary 
implemented the foreclosure proceedings. Therefore, the Court 
concludes as a matter of law that the Lundberg parties had no 
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contractual duties that could have been breached. As a 
corollary, since there was no contract between the plaintiffs and 
the Lundberg parties had no contractual duty, there was also no 
duty or covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the 
Court grants summary judgment to the Lundberg parties on the third 
and fourth causes of action. 
Next, the Backman defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
mistake and civil conspiracy claims for failure to state these 
claims with sufficient particularity. The Court has closely 
examined these claims and concludes that they are not set forth 
with the particularity required under the rules. As it stands, the 
plaintiffs1 pleadings leave to conjecture vital information such as 
precisely who was involved and in what specific scheme. The 
plaintiffs' responding memorandum tries to flesh out the additional 
facts that provide the basis for these mistake and conspiracy 
claims. However, as the Backman defendants' point out, the claims 
must be set forth with sufficient particularity in the pleadings, 
not in memos. Having found that the factual basis of the 
plaintiffs' Fifth, Sixth and Thirteenth Causes of Action is not set 
forth with sufficient particularity, the Court dismisses these 
claims without prejudice under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b). 
This dismissal is predicated solely on Rule 9(b) and not on the 
Backman defendants' alternative argument of dismissal under Rule 
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12(b)(6) • In other words, the Court's inquiry ended when it found 
that the claims were not sufficiently stated. The Court did not 
assess the merit of these claims under Rule 12(b)(6), 
Counsel for the Lundberg parties and the Backman defendants 
should prepare Orders on their respective Motions. The Lundberg 
parties1 Order should indicate that their Motion is granted in the 
entirety. The Backman defendants' Motion should indicate that 
their Rule 9(b) Motion is granted, but that the dismissal is 
without prejudice. 
Dated this -f\j day of September, 2002. 
4 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE 
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other 
similarly situated individuals and entities; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
J SCOTT LUNDBERG. LUNDBERG & 
ASSOCIATES, a Professional Corporation; 
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ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE CERTAIN CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE BACKMAN 
DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 020901052 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendants 
Defendants Backman Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd. and Canyon 
Anderson (collectively the "Backman Defendants") filed a Motion to Dismiss Portions of the 
Complaint. This motion came on for hearing before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on August 
22, 2002. Plaintiff was represented by Lester A. Perry. Defendants Lundberg and Lundberg & 
Associates were represented by Gary A. Weston and Richard M. Hymas. The Backman 
Defendants were represented by R. Willis Orton. Defendant Canyon Anderson was present in 
the courtroom. Having heard argument of counsel and having considered the memoranda filed 
by the parties, on September 30,2002, the court, for good cause shown, issued its Memorandum 
Decision disposing of the Backman Defendants' morion. Therefore, based upon the 
Memorandum Decision, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the Backman Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and the Fifth, Sixth and Thirteenth 
Causes of Action of Plaintiffs Complaint are hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
Leslie A. Lewis 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
By 
Lester A. Perry 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By 
Gary A. Weston 
Attorneys for Defendants Lundberg 
and Lundberg ^Associates 
B y _ 
R.WilIis Orton 
Attorneys for the Backman Defendants 
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J. Scott Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE 
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other 
similarly situated individuals and entities, : PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR LUNDBERG DEFENDANTS 
Plaintiffs. : 
v. : 
J. SCOTT LUNDBERG. LUNDBERG & : 
ASSOCIATES, a Professional Corporation. : 
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a Utah : 
Corporation. BACKMAN-STEWART TITLE • CIMI No 020901052 
SERVICES. LTD . a Utah Limited 
PaTnersh'-p. <~"ANYON ANDERSON. " Hon. Leslie A. Lewis 
RODNEY SERVICES COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants : 
The Motion of the Defendants J Scott Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates for partial 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs" First. Second, Third and Founh Causes of Action of their 
Complaint came on regular!} for heanng before the Honorable Leslie A Lewis on the 22nd day of 
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Third Judicial District 
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August, 2002, with Gary A. Weston and Richard M. Hymas of the firm of Nielsen & Senior 
appearing on behalf of said Defendants, and Lester A. Perry of the firm of Hoole & King 
appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs. The Court heard argument on the Motion, and reviewed the 
pleadings and memoranda filed by the respective parties. Determining that there are no genuine 
issues of fact to be determined by trial, that Plaintiffs have no cause of action against said 
Defendants under the First, Second, Third and Founh Causes of Action of Plaintiffs* Complaint, 
and that said Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Coun has so ruled in its 
Memorandum Decision filed September 30, 2002. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment of Defendants J. Scott Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates is 
granted in its entirety and said Defendants are hereby awarded judgment dismissing, with 
prejudice, the First. Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
DATED this ^O day of October, 2002. 
BY THE CO " LIRTp 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM" 
Le*(er A Perry >" 
Hbole & King 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
RUSSELL, for themselves and for 
all other similarly situated : CASE NO. 020901052 





J, SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG & 
ASSOCIATES, a Professional : 
Corporation; BACKMAN TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; : 
BACKMAN-STEWART TITLE SERVICES, 
LTD., a Utah Limited Partnership; 
CANYON ANDERSON; RODNEY SERVICE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; : 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 18, 
2 003, in connection with the following Motions: Rodney Services 
Company's (Rodney's) Motion for Summary Judgment; Defendants 
Sackman Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd. and 
Canyon Anderson's (collectively referred to as :r.e Eackman 
defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; tr.e L-ndberg 
parties' Motion for Judgment en the Remaining Causes c: Action in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class. At 
tr.e ccncl-S-cn cf tr.e hearing on the afore^enticr.ee v:::crs, the 
Cc^rt tec-: :^e -atter ^nder advisement. The Court r.= _tg rev; had 
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an opportunity to consider the moving and responding memoranda on 
these Motions, having reviewed the relevant case law and in light 
of the oral argument in this case, rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Because the Lundberg parties1 Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Rodney's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Backman defendants1 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings overlap in certain respects, 
the Court will analyze all three Motions in tandem. The Lundberg 
parties bring their Motion following the Court granting their prior 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' 
first four causes of action. As counsel for the Lundberg parties 
emphasized during oral argument, the Court's decision to grant 
partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' first four causes of 
action as to the Lundberg parties has certain ramifications to 
Rodney's Motion for Summary Judgment as it pertains to the 
plaintiff's first four causes of action against it. Although 
counsel summarized the factual underpinnings of the Court's 
September 30, 2002, Memorandum Decision, during oral argument, it 
is important to underscore certain of these facts herein. 
First:, the Court's initial decision established that the 
Lundberg parties never served as counsel cr otherwise entered into 
a legal or business relationship with the plaintiffs. The Lundberg 
oarties did r.ct r.ake ar.v recresentaticns and did net communicate 
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with the plaintiffs when their trust deed was executed. The 
Lundberg parties only communicated with the plaintiffs after they 
defaulted. The Court found as a matter of law on agreed facts that 
the Lundberg parties did not have a confidential or a contractual 
relationship with the plaintiffs and therefore had no fiduciary or 
contractual duties (including no common law duties) towards them. 
Because the facts surrounding Rodney1s involvement with the 
plaintiffs is analogous to the Lundberg parties1 involvement, the 
Court's reasoning in its initial Memorandum Decision is equally 
applicable to Rodney. In fact, Rodney's connection to the 
plaintiffs is even more tenuous because while Mr. Lundberg may have 
held the distinction of being a trustee under the plaintiffs' Trust 
Deed, Rodney's sole connection to the plaintiffs was posting and 
publishing of the Third Notice of Trustee's Sale in connection with 
the third foreclosure of the plaintiffs' Trust Deed. Rodney's 
responsibility m posting and publishing the plaintiffs' Notice 
carries with it no implied fiduciary or contractual cities or even 
the type of statutory obligations that trie Cc^rt found v.ere imposed 
on Mr. Lundberg. Therefore, tne Court grants summary 3^dement to 
Rodney en the plaintiffs' first four causes cf acticn. 
The plaintiffs' renaming claims as tc the Lur.cterg parties, 
Rodney and the Eackman defendants, wnicn are addressed m the 
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various Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, are as follows: (5 l, 2) Restitution Based on Mistake of 
Fact, (6) Restitution Based on Mistake of Law; (7) Tortious Payment 
of Money3; (8) Unjust Enrichment; (9) Wrongful Collection; (10) 
Liability for Intended Consequences; (11) Actionable Fraud; (12) 
Negligent Misrepresentation; (13) Civil Conspiracy; (14) Utah 
Unfair Practices Act; (15) Punitive Damages. 
The Court begins in reverse by ruling that there is no 
independent cause of action for punitive damages. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs1 Fifteenth Cause of Action for punitive damages is 
procedurally inappropriate. In addition, an assessment of the 
conduct alleged indicates that the plaintiffs cannot prove the 
degree of culpability and egregiousness necessary to justify an 
award of punitive damages. Therefore, the Court grants summary 
judgment to the Lundberg parties and Rodney on this cause of 
action. 
The Court next- concludes that the Utah Unfair Practices Act 
has no application to the facts of this case. Foremost, the 
1
 The number in parenthesis designates the number of the cause of action 
2
 The Court previously granted the Backman defendants' Motion to Dismiss the plaintiffs' 
Fifth, Sixth and Thirteenth Causes of Action 
3
 The Seventh. Ninth, Tenth. Eleventh and Twelfth Causes of Action were addressed only 
in the Lundberg parties and Rodneys Motion for Summary Judgment 
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plaintiffs are not competitors of the various defendants and 
therefore lack standing to assert the UPA. Moreover, the 
plaintiffs have not asserted facts from which this Court could find 
that the defendants1 practices had the effect of injuring or 
destroying competition. As counsel pointed out during oral 
argument, the UPA contemplates sales at less than cost to achieve 
a monopoly and destroy competition. The plaintiffs claim that the 
defendants charged more than the actual cost. This claim belies 
any applicability of the UPA. Therefore, the Court grants the 
defendants1 Motions for Summary Judgment and Motion for Judgment on 
Pleadings on the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Cause of Action. 
The Court grants the Lundberg parties' and Rodney's Motions 
for Summary Judgment as they pertain to the plaintiffs' Seventh, 
Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action. The Court agrees chat these 
causes of action have nc foundation in Utah law. However, to the 
extent that these are claims sounding in tort, the Court's 
decisions concerning the lack of duty are dispositive to these 
claims. (The Court reiterates that the few procedural duties that 
are statutory and which could be construed as being for the 
protection of trusters :r.e plaintiffs) were complied with m this 
case] . 
The plaintiffs' renaming claims as tc the Lur.dcerg parties 
and Rodney all center en zr.e premise that these defendants inflated 
RUSSELL V. LUNDBERG PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
certain costs stemming from the plaintiffs1 foreclosure in a manner 
that ran afoul of Utah Code Annotated §§57-1-29 and 31,- which 
limits costs that can be charged in a foreclosure to the actual 
costs incurred. Based on this premise, the plaintiffs assert a 
variety of claims, including (1) mistake of law and fact (because 
they did not know that the costs were allegedly inflated) ; (2) 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation (based on alleged 
misrepresentations that the amounts billed to the lender were the 
amounts actually incurred); (3) that the various defendants engaged 
in a conspiracy to inflate actual costs and (4) that the defendants 
were unjustly enriched as a result of the inflated costs. 
The plaintiffs concede that the foregoing claims would be 
vitiated if the Court finds that the Lundberg parties did not 
violate the law when they (1) charged the original cost of a Trust 
Deed Sale Guarantee (TSG) without deducting a commission they 
subsequently received from Backman-Stewart4 and (2) when they 
delegated the responsibility of publishing and poscing to Rodney 
and passed along the cose of Rodney's administrative fee on these 
4
 The Lundberg parties have provided an Affidavit attesting that these commissions 
stemmed from an ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and due to the large volume of business 
that the Lundberg parties' provided to Backman-Stewart It undisputed that the amount charged 
by the Lundberg parties for the TSGs reflects the amount they actually paid for them 
importantly, the plaintiffs have not disputed that there was no set commission paid for each TSG 
purchased 
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services. To be clear, the plaintiffs allege that these practices 
resulted in their lender (and in turn them) being charged 
foreclosure costs that were inflated and which did not reflect 
"actual costs." 
Before launching into the analysis of whether the Lundberg 
parties1 practices are lawful, the Court notes that all of the 
parties agreed during oral argument that there are no factual 
disputes concerning what these practices are, only the legal 
significance of the same. 
The Court begins by analyzing the costs of posting and 
publication by Rodney. It is significant that while the plaintiffs 
suggest that the Lundberg parties did not need to delegate the 
responsibility of posting and publication to Rodney, they have not 
cited the Court to any legal authority that a trustee is precluded 
from engaging a third-party to perform some of the work necessary 
for a non-judicial foreclosure. In fact, the Court's own legal 
research has not yielded any such legal authority perhaps because 
there is no legal basis to require a trustee to single-handedly 
perform all of the cities accompanying a foreclosure. 
Further, it is ar. economic reality that there are costs 
related cc the er.cacerer.: cf a third-party to perfcrT ser/ices. 
There has beer, no assertions that Rodney is a charitable endeavor 
forT-ed tc provide grai,.i::ous posting and publicancr. services. 
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Instead, Rodney is a business and is clearly allowed to make a 
profit on its transactions. The only issue that the Court can 
perceive in terms of profit is whether the administrative fee being 
charged by Rodney is reasonable, particularly given the tangential 
business relationship between Rodney and the Lundberg parties. 
However, the plaintiffs have not raised this issue and, in fact, do 
not contest the reasonableness of Rodney's fee. The Court's 
understanding of the plaintiffs1 position is that they only contest 
the assessment of the administrative fee in the first place and the 
fact that the fee was passed along to the lender (and in turn to 
them). 
Because the plaintiffs cannot provide the legal basis to 
preclude a trustee's delegation of responsibilities and the 
inevitable increase in costs resulting therefrom", their argument 
as to the propriety of the fee being passed along must fail as a 
matter of law. As the Lundberg parties point out, their actual 
cost for Rodney's posting services, for instance, was $65.00 (which 
included the $30.00 administrative fee) . This actual cost was then 
charged to the lender ar.c was the amount that the plaintiffs were 
required to pay the lender c: reinstate their lean. Because the 
The plaintiffs also do not dispute that there is no legal authorit\ requinng the trustee to 
handle the foreclosure at the lowest cost possible, only at a reasonable cost 
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$65.00 was the "actual cost" borne by the Lundberg parties, the 
plaintiffs cannot claim that the Lundberg parties or Rodneyfs 
practices in regards to the posting/publication costs are unlawful 
or that the costs were "inflated" simply by virtue of Rodney being 
retained to perform services that the Lundberg parties had 
previously performed in-house. 
Similarly, the Court is not persuaded that the Lundberg 
parties were required to deduct the cost of a potential commission 
from the price of the TSG. It is uncontroverted that these 
commissions were not predetermined. Rather, the commissions were 
assessed periodically and had no correlation to a specific TSG. 
Overall, the Court is satisfied that the plaintiffs have 
demonstrated no legal entitlement to a discount as a result of the 
Lundberg parties1 possibly garnering a commission for the volume of 
business they provide to Backman-Stewart. The fact remains that 
the plaintiffs paid the "actual cost" of the TSG, a cost they would 
have had to pay if an entity other than the Lundberc parties had 
been involved. 
Based on che foregoing, the Court determines thai neither the 
Lundberg parties nor Rodney inflated or padded the "actual costs" 
chat were charged to the plaintiffs1 lender and which the lender in 
turn charged to the plaintiffs. These defendants' practices were 
lawful and do not orovice a basis for recovery under the causes of 
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action identified above. Accordingly, the Court grants the 
Lundberg parties1 Motion for Summary Judgment, grants Rodneyfs 
Motion for Summary Judgment and grants the Backman-Stewart 
defendants1 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Since this 
ruling results in the majority, if not all6, of the plaintiffs' 
claims being disposed of, the Court is satisfied that there is no 
need or legal basis for granting the plaintiffs1 Motion for Class 
Certification. Accordingly, the Motion for Class Certification is 
denied. 
6
 Since the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings only addressed the Fourteenth Cause of 
Action and the Court's prior dismissal dealt with three other causes of action, it appears that a 
feu of the plaintiffs' claims against the Backman-Stewart defendants may remain acn\e 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JAMES R RUSSELL and RAYLENE 
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other 
similarly situated individuals and entities, 
Plaintiffs, 
J. SCOTT LUNDBERG, LUNDBERG & 
ASSOCIATES, a Professional 
Corporation, BACKMAN TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
BACKMAN-STEWART TITLE 
SERVICES, LTD., a Utah Limited 
Partnership, CANYON ANDERSON, 
RODNEY SERVICES COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through 
10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING THE 
LUNDBERG PARTIES' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE REMAINING CAUSES 
OF ACTION IN PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT, GRANTING RODNEY 
SERVICE CO.'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
GRANTING THE BACKMAN 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS 
Civil No. 020901052 
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis 
The Motion for Summary Judgment on the Remaining Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint filed by Defendants J. Scott Lundberg and Lundberg & Associates ("the I.undbcrt 
Panics"], the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Rodney Senices Co. [""Rodney""], the 
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Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Backman Title Co., Backman-Stewart Title 
Services, Ltd., and Canyon Anderson ['the Backman Defendants"], and the Motion to Certify 
Class filed by Plaintiffs came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on 
June 18, 2003. Lester A. Perry of the firm of Hoole & King appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, 
Gary A. Weston and Richard M. Hymas of the firm of Nielsen & Senior appeared on behalf of 
the Lundberg Parties and Rodney, and R. Willis Orton of the firm of Kirton & McConkie 
appeared on behalf of the Backman Defendants. 
The Court heard arguments on the motions, and reviewed the memoranda, affidavits and 
exhibits filed by the respective parties in support of, and in opposition to, the motions. Having 
duly considered the matter, the Court has determined and ruled in its Memorandum Decision 
filed August 14, 2003, that there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the causes 
of action against Defendants that are the subject of the dispositive motions before the Court; that 
Plaintiffs are unable to prevail against Defendants on any of those causes of action and that 
Defendants are entitled to judgment on those causes of action as a matter of law, and that, given 
the Court's ruling on the dispositive motions, there is no need or legal basis for certifying the 
class as requested by Plaintiffs. Based upon the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
I. First Four Causes of Action Against Rodnev. In its Memorandum Decision 
dated September 30. 2002, the Court determined that, based upon applicable law and the 
undisputed evidence presented in connection with the Lundberg Parties* prior Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, the Lundberg Parties did not have any confidential or contractual 
relationship with Plaintiffs, and therefore had no fiduciary, contractual or common law duties to 
Plaintiffs. The statutory duties that Scott Lundberg owed to Plaintiffs in his capacity as trustee 
under Plaintiffs' trust deed (which duties were fully satisfied by Lundberg) did not create on the 
part of the Lundberg Parties any fiduciary, contractual or common law duties to Plaintiffs. As a 
result, the Court granted partial summary judgment against Plaintiffs and in favor of the 
Lundberg Parties on Plaintiffs' first cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, second cause of 
action for constructive fraud based on breach of fiduciary duty, third cause of action for breach of 
contract, and fourth cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The prior ruling by the Court provides support with respect to Rodney's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to the first four causes of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint against Rodney. 
The undisputed evidence presented in connection with Rodney's motion established that at no 
time did Rodney do business with Plaintiffs, make any representations to or have any 
communications with Plaintiffs, otherwise deal with Plaintiffs, or have any confidential or 
contractual relationship with Plaintiffs. Based upon that undisputed evidence, the Court has 
determined that Rodney had no fiduciary, contractual or common law duties to Plaintiffs as a 
matter of law. As a result, Rodney is entitled to judgment against Plaintiffs on the first four 
causes of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, and summary judgment in favor of Rodney on those 
first four causes of action is hereby granted. 
2. Fifteenth Cause of Action for Punitive Damages Against the Lundberg 
Parties and Rodnev. Plaintiffs' fifteenth cause of action against the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney for punitive damages is procedurally defective and inappropriate as there is no 
independent cause of action for pumme damages under Utah law In addition, even ifPlaintiffs 
were able to pre\ail on an\ of their other causes of action against the Lundberg Parties or 
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Rodney, the evidence presented regarding the conduct of those defendants, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, lacks the degree of culpability and egregiousness necessary to 
support or justify an award of punitive damages as a matter of law. Therefore, the Lundberg 
Parties and Rodney are entitled to summary judgment on the fifteenth cause of action in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the Lundberg Parties 
and Rodney on that cause of action. 
3. Fourteenth Cause of Action for Violations of the Utah Unfair Practices Act 
Against Defendants. Plaintiffs1 fourteenth cause of action against Defendants is for alleged 
violations of the Utah Unfair Practices Act ["UP A"], but the UP A does not apply in this case. 
Plaintiffs are not competitors of any of the Defendants. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not sell 
or buy a Trust Deed Sale Guarantee ["TSG"] or other title product or service, and therefore were 
not competing sellers or disfavored buyers of the TSGs and other title products and services that 
were sold by Backman-Stewart and purchased by the Lundberg Parties. In addition, Plaintiffs 
have not alleged, and no evidence has been presented to suggest, that the commissions paid by 
Backman-Stewart to the Lundberg Parties or any other practices of the Defendants have damaged 
Plaintiffs in any way. Because Plaintiffs ha\ e not suffered any distinct or palpable injury as a 
result of the commissions received by the Lundberg Parties from Backman-Stewart. Plaintiffs 
lack standing to assert claims under the LTPA against Defendants. 
The UPA prohibits an entit} from selling goods or services at less than cost where the 
result of such pricing is the establishment of a monopoly or the destruction of competition. 
Plaintiffs have presented no facts shoeing that Defendants' practices had the effect of lessening 
competition or creating a monopol} To the contrary Plaintiffs allege that the amount the 
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Lundberg Parties charged the lender or beneficiary under Plaintiffs' trust deed for the TSGs that 
they bought from Backman Title was more — not less - than the Lundberg Parties were required 
to pay for those TSGs. That claim belies the applicability of the UPA to the facts of this case. 
Backman-Stewarfs action in paying commissions to the Lundberg Parties in recognition 
of Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-Stewart and for the large amount of business that 
the Lundberg Parties' provided to Backman-Stewart does not violate the UPA. Based upon the 
undisputed evidence and applicable law, all of the Defendants are entitled to judgment against 
Plaintiffs on the fourteenth cause of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, and judgment in favor of 
Defendants on that cause of action is hereby granted. 
4. Seventh. Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action for Alleged Tortious Payment of 
Mone\\ Wrongful Collection and Liability for Intended Consequences Against the 
Lundberg Parties and Rodney. Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action for tortious payment of 
money, their ninth cause of action for wrongful collection, and their tenth cause of action for 
liability for intended consequences have no foundation in Utah law, and therefore fail to state a 
claim against the Lundberg Parties or Rodney upon which relief may be granted. Moreover, even 
if these causes of action were recognized under Utah law as legitimate claims sounding in tort, 
the Court's determination that the Lundberg Parties and Rodney owed no fiduciary, contractual 
or common-law duty to Plaintiffs precludes Plaintiffs from recovering against the Lundberg 
Parties and Rodney on these claims as a matter of law. 
Based upon the undisputed evidence and applicable law, the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney are entitled to, and are hereby granted, summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the 
seventh, ninth and tenth causes of action m Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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5. Fifth. Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Causes of Action 
Against the Lundberg Parties and Rodney, Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action for restitution 
based on mistake of fact, their sixth cause of action for restitution based on mistake of law, their 
eighth cause of action for unjust enrichment, their eleventh cause of action for fraud, their twelfth 
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, and their thirteenth cause of action for civil 
conspiracy are all based on the premise that the Lundberg Parties and Rodney inflated certain 
costs stemming from the foreclosure of Plaintiffs' trust deed in a manner that ran afoul of Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-29 and § 57-1-31, which limits costs that can be charged in a foreclosure to the 
actual costs incurred. Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to restitution based on mistake of fact 
and mistake of law because they did not know that the costs were allegedly inflated; that the 
Lundberg Parties and Rodney were unjustly enriched as a result of the receipt by them of the 
alleged inflated costs; that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation based on alleged misrepresentations that the amounts billed to the lender were 
the amounts actually incurred; and that the Lundberg Parties and Rodney engaged in a conspiracy 
to inflate the actual costs. 
Plaintiffs concede that the foregoing claims would be vitiated if the Court finds that the 
Lundberg Parties did not violate the law when they (1) charged the original cost of a TSG 
without deducting a commission the\ subsequently received from Backman-Stewart and (2) 
when they delegated the responsibilit) of publishing and posting to Rodne> and passed along to 
the lender the cost of Rodne\ *s administrative fee and other charges for pro\ iding these services 
The Court is not aware of an\ legal authority that proudes that a trustee is precluded from 
engaging a third-party to perform some of the work necessary for a non-judicial foreclosure. 
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Indeed, the law does not require a trustee to single-handedly perform all of the duties associated 
with such a foreclosure. There also is no legal requirement that a trustee handle a foreclosure at 
the lowest cost possible. Such costs simply must be reasonable. Accordingly, based upon the 
undisputed evidence presented, there was nothing unlawful in the Lundberg Parties's action in 
hiring Rodney to perform posting and publication services for it, and in paying Rodney for its 
services. There also is nothing unlawful in Rodney making a profit on the services that it 
provides. Plaintiffs have not argued, and have not presented any evidence to suggest, that the 
administrative fee and other amounts charged by Rodney for its services, and paid by the 
Lundberg Parties, were unreasonable. 
Because the Plaintiffs cannot provide any legal basis for precluding a trustee's delegation 
of responsibilities associated with a non-judicial foreclosure and incurring the reasonable costs 
resulting therefrom, their argument as to the propriety of the fee being passed along to the lender 
and then to Plaintiffs fails as a matter of law. It is undisputed that the actual cost for Rodney's 
posting services was $65.00, which included a $30.00 administrative fee. It similarly is 
undisputed that the actual cost to the Lundberg Parties for Rodney's publication services was 
S 143.40, the same amount paid by Rodney to the newspaper that published the notices, and that 
Rodney received a commission of S30.00 from the newspaper, making it unnecessary for Rodney 
to charge the Lundberg Parties any additional administrative fee for its services. The exact 
amount of these actual costs paid by the Lundberg Parties was charged to the lender, which was 
the same amount that Plaintiffs were required to pay to the lender to reinstate their loan. Because 
the amount paid by Plaintiffs for these ''actual costs1' was the same amount paid by the Lundberg 
Parties, as well as by the lender. Plaintiffs cannot claim that the practices of the Lundberg Parties 
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and Rodney with respect to the posting and publication services were unlawful These costs were 
not "inflated" simply because Rodney was retained to perform services that the Lundberg Parties 
previously had performed in-house. 
Similarly, the Lundberg Parties were not required to deduct the cost of a potential 
commission that they might later receive from Backman-Stewart from the price that they paid for 
the TSGs in determining the amount that would be billed to the lender for the TSGs. The 
commissions paid by Backman-Stewart were not predetermined, were paid periodically, and had 
no direct correlation to a specific TSG. Plaintiffs were not entitled to a discount on the amount 
that they were required to pay to the lender for the TSGs purchased by the Lundberg Parties in 
connection with the foreclosure of their trust deed because of the possibility that the Lundberg 
Parties might receive a commission in the future based on the large volume of business that they 
provided to Backman-Stewart and Lundberg's ownership interest in Backman-Stewart. 
It is undisputed that the amounts paid by Plaintiffs to reimburse the lender for the actual 
cost of the TSGs was the same amount that they would have been required to pay if any other 
person or entity serving as trustee had purchased the TSGs in connection with the foreclosure of 
Plaintiffs' trust deed. 
Based on the undisputed facts before the Court and applicable law, the Court determines 
that neither the Lundberg Parties nor Rodney inflated or padded the ''actual costs'' that were 
charged to the Plaintiffs' lender and which the lender m turn charged to Plaintiffs Accordingly, 
the practices of the Lundberg Parties and Rodney that have been challenged by Plaintiffs in this 
action were law ful, and provide no basis for recovery under Plaintiffs' claims for mistake of fact, 
mistake of law. unjust enrichment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or ci\ ll conspiracy 
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Moreover, because Plaintiffs did not confer a benefit on Rodney, there is no legal basis 
for their claims against Rodney for restitution based on mistake of fact or mistake of law or for 
unjust enrichment. In addition, because Rodney made no representations to Plaintiffs of any 
kind, Plaintiffs may not prevail against Rodney on their claims for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Lundberg Parties and Rodney are entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law on the fifth, sixth, eighth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth causes of 
action in Plaintiffs' Complaint, and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the 
Lundberg Parties and Rodney on those causes of action. 
6. Motion for Class Certification. The Court's action in granting the Lundberg 
Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Remaining Claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Rodney's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Backman Parties' Motion for Judgment of the 
Pleadings effectively disposes of all of the causes of action against the Lundberg Parties and 
Rodney and most of the causes of action against the Backman Parties. As a result, there is no 
need or legal basis for granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification. Accordingly, the 
Motion for Class Certification is hereby denied. 
DATED this J$ «day of September, 2003. 
BY THE^OURT: 
^ , . • . ; ' \ 
•/.< 
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HONORABLE LESLIE A LEWIS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2003,1 served upon all parties the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING THE LUNDBERG PARTIES' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION IN 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT, GRANTING RODNEY SERVICE CO.'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING THE BACKMAN DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
CERTIFY CLASS by causing a true and correct copy thereof to be mailed via first-class United 
States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Lester A. Perry 
Hoole & King, L.C. 
4276 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-2634 
R. Willis Orton 
Kirton & McConkie 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ORTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Attorneys for Defendants Backman Title 
Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd. 
and Canyon Anderson 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE 
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other 
similarly situated individuals and entities; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
J. SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG & 
ASSOCIATES, a Professional Corporation; 
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation; BACKMAN-STEWART 
TITLE SERVICES, LTD., a Utah Limited 
Partnership; CANYON ANDERSON. 
RODNEY SERVICES COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation; and JOHN DOES 1 through 
10. 
Defendants 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
BACKMAN STEWART 
DEFENDANTS ON REMAINING 
CLAIMS 
Civil No. 020901052 
Judge Leslie A. Leu is 
On September 3, 2003. Defendants Backman Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title 
Services, Ltd. and Canyon Anderson (collectively the "Backman Stewart Defendants"), by and 
through their attorneys of record, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Remaining 
Claims with supporting memorandum. On September 9, 2003, Plaintiffs, through their counsel, 
submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to the Backman Stewart Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, in which they admit that "[bjased on the Court's memorandum decision of 
August 14,2003, the plaintiffs cannot defend against the motion of the Backman Stewart 
Defendants." Backman Stewart Defendants then filed a Notice to Submit the matter for decision. 
Therefore, for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT defendants Backman Title Company, Backman-
Stewart Title Services, Ltd., and Canyon Anderson are entitled to, and are hereby granted, 
summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the Eighth and Fifteenth Causes of Action in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and those claims are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this Is day of September, 2003. 
Cp u 
Leslie A. Lewis 
District Court Judge 
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Approved as to form: 
By 
Lester A. Perry 
Attorneys for^l^tiffe 
R. Willis Orton 
Attorneys for the Backman Stewart Defendants 
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R. Willis Orton 
Attorneys for the Backman Stewart Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE BACKMAN STEWART 
DEFENDANTS ON REMAINING CLAIMS.to be mailed, postage prepaid, this / ] _ ^ day of 
September, 2003, to: 
Lester A. Perry 
Hoole & King, L.C. 
4276 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124-2634 
Gary A. Weston 
Richard M. Hymas 
Nielsen & Senior 
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 




R. Willis Orton (2484) 
ORTON&McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Attorneys for Defendants Backman Title 
Company, Backman-Stewart Title Services, Ltd 
and Canyon Anderson 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES R. RUSSELL and RAYLENE 
RUSSELL, for themselves and for all other 
similarly situated individuals and entities; : ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
: PREJUDICE 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : Civil No. 020901052 
J. SCOTT LUNDBERG; LUNDBERG & : Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
ASSOCIATES, a Professional Corporation; : 
BACKMAN TITLE COMPANY, a Utah : 
Corporation; BACKMAN-STEWART : 
TITLE SERVICES, LTD., a Utah Limited : 
Partnership; CANYON ANDERSON; : 
RODNEY SERVICES COMPANY, a Utah : 
Corporation; and JOHN DOES 1 through : 
10, : 
Defendants. : 
Based on the accompanying Stipulation for Order of Dismissal, good cause appaering 
therefor, 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SALT 
6y 
NOV " 4 2003 
COUNTY 
# Deputy Clerk 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' Fifth, Sixth and Thirteenth Causes of Action 
of the Complaint as against defendants Backman Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title 
Services, Ltd. and Canyon Anderson are dismissed with prejudice, each of the parties to bear 
their own costs. 
DATED this j££ day of October, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
" -/ ^ /y By A fuZiA 
Lerfer A. Perry f\ 
Attprneys for Pontiffs 
By_ 
K / C ^ -
R. Willis Orton 
Attorneys for Defendants Backman 
Title Company, Backman-Stewart Title 
Services, Ltd. and Canyon Anderson 
By_ 4--
Lewi 
Leslie A. Lewis 
District Court Judge 
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